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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this appeal is based on Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2(3)(j), as amended, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether a person who has sustained undisputed damages 
under an open penalty indemnity bond issued to protect her and 
who receives no cooperation of any kind from either the issuer of 
the stock, the issuer's transfer agent, or the insurance company 
which issued the bond (Cross-Appellees herein), during which time 
such person's stock — which she is prevented from obtaining 
possession of — increases substantially in value, has a cause of 
action against any c>r all such entities for breach of an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing (i.e., Count III of 
Cross-Appellant's amended complaint). [Emphasis added.] 
Whether a person who has sustained undisputed damages 
under an open penalty indemnity bond issued to protect her and 
who is instructed by the obligee to deal directly with the 
obligor on the bond to resolve her claim, and, who does in fact 
deal directly with the bonding companies for several months to no 
avail (while the stock such person/owner has been deprived of 
increases substantially in value in the interim), and who is 
further informed directly by the bonding companies that they will 
resolve the claim with her directly but never do, has a cause of 
action against the bonding companies for either breach of an 
implied third-party beneficiary contract or; bad faith refusal 
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(i.e., Counts IV and V of Cross-Appellantfs amended complaint). 
[Emphasis added.] 
(a) Standard of Review. 
Because this appeal involves summary dismissal of 
Cross-Appellant Robbins1 claims, this Court is free to reappraise 
the trial court's legal conclusions. Berube v. Fashion Centre, 
Ltd., 104 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 771 P.2d 1033, 1039 (Utah Sup. Ct. 
1989); Commerce Financial v. Markwest Corp., 142 Ut. Adv. Rep. 
20, 22, 806 P.2d 200 (Ut. Ct. of App. 1990). Accordingly, this 
Court reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for 
correctness and accords them no particular deference. Bountiful 
v. Riley, 124 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Ut. Sup. 
Ct. 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The lower courtfs cursory dismissal of Counts III, IV, 
and V of Mrs. Robbins1 amended complaint violates the open court 
provisions of the Utah Constitution. Art. 1, §11, Title 1A, Utah 
Code Ann., p. 83. It may also violate the Seventh Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution. Title 1A, Utah Code Ann., p. 20. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(a) Nature of the proceedings. This appeal involves 
summary dismissal of Counts III, IV, and V of 
Cross-Appellant/Plaintifffs Amended Complaint, Exhibit "A" 
hereto; R. 69-114. Count III alleges a tort claim against all 
Cross-Appellees for breach of an implied covenant of good faith 
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and fair dealing; Count IV alleges breach of an implied third-
party beneficiary contract as against the Insurance Company 
Appellees ("ICAs"); Count V alleges the tort of bad faith refusal 
on the part of the ICAs, 
(b) Course of proceedings and disposition below. The 
lower court granted Cross-Appellant Robbinsf motion for summary 
judgment on Counts I and II of her amended complaint. The 
Cross-Appellees1 then obtained Rule 54(b) certification to appeal 
such ruling. Mrs. Robbins thus filed this cross-appeal relative 
to Counts III, IV, and V. Mrs. Robbins1 negligence claim remains 
intact below and a trial, for obvious economic reasons, cannot 
proceed until this appeal is resolved. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Several years ago, Cross-Appellant/Plaintiff LeAnna 
(Broadwater) Robbins1 ("Cross-Appellant" or "Mrs. Robbins") 
purchased 8,000 shares of stock of Cross-Appellee Check Rite 
International, Inc. ("Check Rite") from Potter Investment 
Company, a local securities broker-dealer. (113, Amended 
Complaint, Exhibit "A" hereto; R. 69-114.) 
2. Pursuant to her purchase, Mrs. Robbins received 
Check Rite Certificate No. 258, registered in the name of 
Defendant Scott J. Fletcher ("Fletcher"), a certificate which was 
1
 Since this case was filed in 1989, Cross-Appellant/Plaintiff has remarried and 
now goes by the name of Robbins as opposed to Broadwater. 
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endorsed-over by Fletcher and properly signature guaranteed. 
(113, Amended Complaint.) 
3. Mrs. Robbins held the certificate in "street name" 
and in May, 1988, presented such certificate to Check Rite's 
transfer agent for registration into her name. The price of 
Check Rite stock was trading at about 25<t-30<£ per share. (136, 
Amended Complaint.) 
4. On May 4, 1988, after Mrs. Robbins had presented 
Certificate No. 258 to Check Rite's stock transfer agent, 
Cross-Appellee Atlas Stock Transfer ("Atlas"), for transfer and 
registration into her name, Atlas refused transfer, kept Mrs. 
Robbins' certificate, and canceled it, further refusing to issue 
her a new certificate. (See Exhibit "J" to Plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint, Exhibit "A" hereto.) Atlas' justification for refusal 
was that Certificate No. 258 had been reported lost or stolen by 
Defendant Scott J. Fletcher. In reality, however, Fletcher had 
previously sold such certificate through Potter Investment, who 
had in turn sold the same to Mrs. Robbins. In other words, 
because Fletcher had posted a lost instrument bond relative to 
Certificate No. 258 and, as a result, obtained 8,000 additional 
replacement shares for himself, Atlas was required to place a 
"stop transfer" on Certificate No. 258. (137, Amended 
Complaint.) 
5. Atlas informed Mrs. Robbins that Fletcher had posted 
the open penalty indemnity bond with Cross-Appellee Northwestern 
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National (hereinafter "Insurance Company Appellee" or "ICA")2. 
Atlas further instructed Mrs. Robbins to deal directly with 
Northwestern to resolve her claim. Atlas said that it did not 
know how to contact Northwestern about this problem inasmuch as 
it was "Northwestern1s problem." Atlas specifically advised Mrs. 
Robbins to contact Northwestern directly and resolve the matter 
with it on her own. (Ifs 37 and 38, Amended Complaint; 13, 
Exhibit "B" hereto.) 
6. While Mrs. Robbins was instructed to deal directly 
with the ICAs, it is undisputed that the ICAs first received 
formal notice of her claim by at least May 20, 1988. ($2, 
Exhibit "D" hereto, R. 390; Answers to Plaintiff1s First Set of 
Interrogatories.) 
7. Mrs. Robbins, with due diligence, sought to and did 
contact the ICAs1 local Salt Lake branch office(s) as per Atlas' 
instructions. When she reached someone there in May 1988, she 
gave an employee the entire factual situation and background. 
Such employee informed Mrs. Robbins that he or she would "look 
into the situation" and immediately get back to her. 
Mrs. Robbins heard nothing. Having heard nothing for some time, 
Mrs. Robbins again phoned and reiterated the facts of her problem 
and informed the ICAs that Atlas had told her that they would 
2
 Insurance Company Appellee Northwestern, the obligor on the open penalty 
indemnity bond subject of this suit, was absorbed by Insurance Company Appellee Old 
Republic Surety. Thus, both were named as defendants in Mrs. Robbins' Amended 
Complaint. 
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remedy the problem, specifically, that they would buy her 8,000 
replacement shares of Check Rite. The local ICA employee 
Mrs. Robbins again talked to on this second occasion said he or 
she would look into the matter and again get back to 
Mrs. Robbins. Mrs. Robbins again heard nothing for some time. 
Becoming frustrated that no one would help her, Mrs. Robbins 
phoned the Salt Lake ICA office a third time and demanded to know 
who she had to speak to directly to resolve her problem. At such 
point, Mrs. Robbins was directed to the ICAs' home office in 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Mrs. Robbins telephoned the home office of 
the ICAs and eventually, after much time, effort, conversation, 
and inquiry, was able, in late June 1988, to talk to Mr. Paul 
S. Guardalabene ("Guardalabene"), Assistant Claims Attorney for 
the ICAs. (12, Exhibit "D" hereto, R. 389-392; l"s 39 and 40, 
Amended Complaint.) 
8. Guardalabene, the ICAs1 agent and employee, informed 
Mrs. Robbins that he would resolve the matter with her directly. 
(I's 40 and 41 and Exhibits "K" and "L", Amended Complaint; 14, 
Exhibit "B" hereto, R. 186-190.) 
9. During this time, namely, June end/early July 19 88, 
Guardalabene contacted George "John" Potter of Potter Investment 
Company, the local stock brokerage firm who had sold Certificate 
No. 258 to Mrs. Robbins. Mr. Potter informed Guardalabene that 
penny stocks such as Check Rite were "highly volatile" and that, 
not knowing whether it could skyrocket in price, Guardalabene 
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ought to hurry and buy Mrs. Robbins 8,000 shares of replacement 
stock. (Affidavit of George "John" Potter, R. 381-383; 142, 
Amended Complaint.) 
10. Guardalabene and Mrs. Robbins, during the ensuing 
period, continued to converse and Guardalabene led Mrs. Robbins 
to reasonably believe that the ICAs had a direct legal obligation 
of some kind to her, particularly in that there was no other 
reason why Guardalabene took it upon himself to resolve the 
matter with her directly. (141, Amended Complaint; I!s 4 and 5, 
Exhibit ,fBM hereto.) 
11. Based on her direct and continued dealings with the 
Guardalabene, Mrs. Robbins came to believe that she had a 
"contract" of some kind with the ICAs or that they otherwise had 
a legal duty or other obligation to resolve the problem directly 
with her. (14, Exhibit "B" hereto.) 
12. It is undisputed that between May 1988 and early 
August 1988 — the time period during which Guardalabene was 
negotiating directly with Mrs. Robbins and allegedly 
investigating the matter — the price of Check Rite stock 
increased from approximately 25<t per share to $l-5/16ths per 
share.3 It is further undisputed that Guardalabene knew the 
price of Check Rite was on the rise and continuing to rise during 
this time. (1's 47 and 49 and Exhibit "L", Amended Complaint.) 
3
 This was due to the fact that Check Rite announced some kind of merger 
transaction — a transaction which, after several months, eventually fell through. 
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13. As time went on, Guardalabene neglected to 
investigate the matter and, after stalling Mrs. Robbins for 
several months, continued to inform Mrs. Robbins that he was 
still "working on it." Eventually, to further stall Mrs. 
Robbins' claim, Guardalabene even went so far as to instruct Mrs. 
Robbins to deal directly with Defendant Fletcher. (15, Exhibit 
"E" hereto, R. 415.) Eventually, after several months and while 
the price of Check Rite stock had risen dramatically in price and 
reached its peak, Guardalabene finally informed Mrs. Robbins that 
there was a question as to whether Fletcher's signature on 
Certificate No. 258 was a forgery. (17, Exhibit "B" hereto, R. 
188.) This latest excuse on the part of Guardalabene was put 
forth even though Fletcher himself sold the stock and had 
received a check from his stockbroker, Potter Investment, for its 
sale. (143, Amended Complaint; 17, Exhibit "B" hereto; 15, 
Exhibit "E" hereto.) 
14. After the market price of Check Rite plummeted, 
Guardalabene informed Mrs. Robbins that she never should have 
been dealing with him all along -- as if it had been her fault 
for taking his representations at face value for several 
months -- and he informed her that she then had to deal, and 
should have dealt all along with Cross-Appellees Atlas, Check 
Rite, or even Defendant Fletcher. (146, Amended Complaint; l's 8 
and 9, Exhibit "B" hereto; 15, Exhibit "E.) 
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15• Because Mrs, Robbins was unable to possess and sell 
her 8,000 shares of Check Rite, Mrs. Robbins believes she has 
been directly damaged by the ICAs1 continuous "lulling activity", 
regardless of how such is characterized in her Amended Complaint. 
(19, Exhibit "B" hereto; 17, Exhibit "D" hereto.) 
16. Mrs. Robbins never received any replacement stock 
or any other compensation as a result of the conduct of 
Cross-Appellees. Mrs. Robbins also does not recall the ICAs ever 
having informed her that she was not an "obligee" on the bond 
until after the price of Check Rite stock had plummeted. 
[Emphasis added.] The ICAs further never informed Mrs. Robbins 
that she was not an "intended beneficiary" on the bond. Thus, 
there can be no dispute that Mrs. Robbins was led to believe by 
the ICAs that it was appropriate for her to have been dealing 
with them directly to resolve her claim. (lfs 41, 43, 44, 45, 
and 46 of Amended Complaint; 12 and 6, Exhibit "D" hereto; 13, 
Exhibit "E" hereto.) 
17. After the price of Check Rite dropped and because 
Mrs. Robbins did not believe that the matter would ever be 
resolved, Mrs. Robbins hired counsel who exchanged settlement 
correspondence with Guardalabene commencing as late as September 
21, 1988. Since no settlement could be reached by the parties as 
to Mrs. Robbins1 damages, and in the interim, because the stock 
had fallen well below $1.25 and $l-5/16ths per share to virtual 
worthlessness, this suit was filed by Mrs. Robbins in April 1989. 
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As a direct result of being forced by the Cross-Appellees to hire 
legal counsel to resolve the problem — a problem that should 
have been resolved without litigation — Mrs. Robbins has also 
incurred substantial unwarranted attorney's fees and costs as 
additional damages. (I's 8 and 9, Exhibit "B" hereto; 15, 
Exhibit "E" hereto.) 
18. On June 26, 1989, after Mrs. Robbins filed her 
Amended Complaint in the lower court, the ICAs made a motion to 
dismiss. The trial court ordered such motion held in abeyance 
until discovery was completed. (R. 259-260.) Mrs. Robbins 
resisted such motion with two affidavits, copies of which are 
attached hereto as Exhibits "B" and "C".4 (R. 186-195) While 
discovery in the lower court proceedings has never been 
completed, the ICAs, on February 27, 1990, renewed, re-entitled 
and re-filed their previous motion to dismiss as one for partial 
summary judgment dismissing Counts III, IV, and V of the Amended 
Complaint. (R. 307-309) At the same time, no new arguments or 
facts were presented to the lower court by the ICAs. 
Mrs. Robbins resisted such renewed motion with her affidavit 
filed in support of her own motion for summary judgment on Counts 
I and II, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "D." 
(R. 389-392) Mrs. Robbins further resisted the "renewed11 motion 
4
 Mrs. Robbins also made a request to treat the ICAs1 motion to dismiss as one 
for summary judgment (R. 183-185), a request ignored by the lower court. See last 
sentence of Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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with her own opposing affidavit and a Rule 56(f) affidavit 
attesting how and why discovery was not complete as to Counts 
III, IV, and V, the latter of which was consistent with the lower 
court's previous ruling in that regard. The latter two opposing 
affidavits are attached hereto as Exhibits "E" and "F." 
(R. 413-416 and 542-547, respectively). Nonetheless, on May 24, 
1990, the lower court dismissed Counts III, IV, and V without 
cause and as an obvious trade-off for granting Mrs. Robbins a 
summary judgment on Counts I and II of her Amended Complaint, a 
judgment which Cross-Appellees have also appealed to this Court. 
(R. 710-712; see also Exhibit "B" to Mrs. Robbins1 Docketing 
Statement.) This cross-appeal has ensued. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The crux of Mrs. Robbins1 cross-appeal is Rule 12(b)(6), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. There can be little dispute that 
Mrs. Robbins has been damaged by the Cross-Appellees. 
Mrs. Robbins merely lent titles to Counts III, IV, and V in an 
effort to give Cross-Appellees some notice as to that with which 
they are charged. The titles of such causes of action are not on 
trial — only the potential liability of Cross-Appellees. Yet, 
such liability should be within the province of a jury. The 
lower court simply ignored U.S. and Utah Supreme Court standards 
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in dismissing counts III-V of Mrs, Robbins' amended complaint as 
a matter of law.5 
Mrs. Robbins1 fourth claim for relief, a claim against 
the ICAs grounded in contract, is valid because Mrs. Robbins is a 
creditor beneficiary and/or an intended beneficiary on the bond. 
Further, the bond by its own terms, provides for "absolute 
liability." (See Exhibit "E" to the amended complaint, Ex. "A" 
hereto.) 
Mrs. Robbins1 third and fifth claims for relief are 
grounded in tort. These claims are valid based on Beck 
v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Ut. Sup. Ct. 1985) 
and Culp Construction Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 137 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 4, 6 and notes 9 and 12, 795 P.2d 650 (Ut. Sup. Ct. 
1990)(". . . our holding in Beck does not preclude the bringing 
of a tort claim independently of a contract claim . . . . 
Furthermore, 'privity of contract is not a necessary prerequisite 
to liability.•"). 
5 Conely v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101 -102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 
(1957)(a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears 
beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief); 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 LEd.2d 90 (1974)(a trial court, in ruling 
on a motion to dismiss, is required to view the complaint in a light most favorable to 
plaintiff); Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232-33, 81 LEd.2d 
59 (1984)(it is only proper to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim when plaintiff 
can prove no set of facts which would entitle plaintiff to relief); Burnett v. Utah Power & 
Light Co., 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 797 P.2d 1096 (Ut. Sup. Ct. September 4, 1990)(involuntary 
dismissal is a severe measure and is only appropriate where it appears to a "certainty" that 
plaintiff cannot recover); Avila v. Winn, 136 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 794 P.2d 20, 22 (Ut. Sup. Ct. 
1990)(involuntary dismissal only allowed if plaintiff fails to show that upon the facts and the 
law, he or she has no right to recover). 
- 1 2 -
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, MRS. ROBBINS IS A THIRD-PARTY 
CREDITOR BENEFICIARY ON THE OPEN PENALTY INDEMNITY 
BOND AND THEREFORE COUNT IV OF HER AMENDED COMPLAINT 
STATES A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION IN CONTRACT AGAINST 
THE INSURANCE COMPANY CROSS-APPELLEES ("ICA"S). 
The ICAs admit in the lower court proceedings that the 
open penalty indemnity bond upon which Mrs. Robbins is suing is a 
third-party beneficiary contract. They contend, however, that 
Mrs. Robbins is not an "intended beneficiary" thereunder. This 
contention is made even though the bond reads as follows: 
The Surety agrees that its liability herein 
under shall be absolute, regardless of any 
liability of the Principal hereunder, whether 
by reason of any irregular or unauthorized 
execution of, or failure to execute this bond, 
or any absence or interest of the Principal in 
the subject matter hereof, or otherwise. 
[Emphasis added.] 
See Exhibit "E" to Mrs. Robbins1 Amended Complaint, a copy of the 
bond in issue. 
Relative to Mrs. Robbins1 contract claim, the threshold 
issue is whether Mrs. Robbins is either a donee beneficiary or 
creditor beneficiary under the bond. Schwinghammer v. Alexander, 
21 Utah 2d 418, 446 P.2d 1254, 415 (Sup. Ct. of Ut. 1968)(holding 
that one must be either a donee or creditor beneficiary to have 
an enforceable contract right).6 In Fleck v. National Property 
6
 See also Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 125 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 47, 795 
P.2d 1138 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990); Palmer v. Davis, 155 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 36, _ P.2d _ (Ut. Ct. 
App. March 7, 1991). 
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Management, Inc., 590 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Sup. Ct. of Ut. 1979), 
this Court held that a creditor beneficiary is one in whom the 
promiseefs expressed intent is that some third-party shall 
receive performance and satisfaction in discharge of some actual 
supposed duty or liability of the promisee, in this case, 
Cross-Appellees Atlas and Check Rite. In this case, the purpose 
of the bond was to insure that Mrs. Robbins would be issued or 
delivered replacement stock in satisfaction and discharge of the 
duty or liability created by such bond. 
In the trial court below, the ICAs cited Tracy Collins 
Bank & Trust v. Dickamore, 652 P.2d 1314 (Ut. 1982), for the 
proposition that nothing in the bond agreement evidences that the 
ICAs intended to benefit Mrs. Robbins. On the contrary, the bond 
instrument, by its own terms, states that the liability of the 
obligor, namely, the ICAs, is "absolute." Further, the bond was 
put up or posted for Mrs. Robbins1 exclusive benefit though no 
one knew who she was or would be, unlike the facts in Tracy 
Collins. 
In this case, there is no question that the bond was put 
up explicitly for Mrs. Robbins1 benefit or someone like her, 
otherwise there would nave been no reason for Defendant Fletcher 
to have obtained it. Tracy Collins involved a secured creditor 
who never enforced its right as such. There is no question that 
the Cross-Appellees in this case obtained the bond to protect a 
person like Mrs. Robbins at the time the bond was posted. 
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[Emphasis Ours,] In Tracy Collins, the contracting parties knew 
nothing of the secured creditor plaintiff at the time the 
contract was entered into. The Tracy Collins Court further said 
that if benefits are "incidental" then the person suing cannot 
recover.7 
Mrs. Robbins is not a "stranger" to the promise (bond) 
because the purpose of the bond is to safeguard against her 
appearance at some future date. Cross-Appellee Atlas, as 
Atkinson in Tracy Collins, surely cannot testify that it knew a 
person like Mrs. Robbins would never ultimately make a request 
for transfer as Atkinson knew absolutely nothing of Tracy Collins 
in Tracy Collins. Tracy Collins involved disbursements out of an 
escrow to a secured creditor that Atkinson knew nothing about. 
Tracy Collins' remedy was to enforce its rights only as a secured 
creditor: a remedy Mrs. Robbins is not so fortunate to have at 
her disposal.8 
7
 The Tracy Collins Court further stated that whether the benefit to be 
conferred upon the plaintiff was "incidental" to performance is a question of fact 
determined by the intentions of the parties. Tracy Collins supra at p. 1315. Here, there is 
nothing remotely "incidental" about Mrs. Robbins' relationship to the Cross-Appellees simply 
because the ICAs' performance would be triggered when a person like Mrs. Robbins 
appeared on the scene to make a claim on the bond. Clearly, the exclusive intent of the 
bond was to protect a prospective third-party, otherwise there would be no bond. 
8
 It is also readily arguable that because Atlas instructed Mrs. Robbins to deal 
directly with the ICAs, that such effected either a waiver or an express assignment of its 
contractual rights to Mrs. Robbins. As a result, she thus stands in Atlas' shoes as an 
obligee on the bond. 
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In Tremble v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453, 454 (Utah 1981), 
this Court held that a third-party beneficiary must essentially 
prove that the contract was intended to benefit him directly. In 
this case, there is no one else who could or would conceivably 
benefit directly from the bond other than Mrs. Robbins.9 The 
Tremble Court, as the Court in Tracy Collins, further stated that 
it is an issue of fact as to what the parties intended. Id. 
Based on these authorities, the lower court manifestly erred in 
dismissing Count IV without a trial. 
Tremble involved an earnest money agreement providing: 
"Buyer to be responsible for real-estate commissions." The 
earnest money agreement contained no language that, in and of 
itself, it would benefit the third-party broker. This is because 
he was to get paid separately by the buyer, his client. In this 
case Mrs. Robbins was not Atlas1 client and the bond only 
contemplates restitution to Mrs. Robbins if and when Certificate 
No. 258 resurfaced, which it did. Clearly, there is no other 
purpose for the bond. In Tremble, the purpose of the earnest 
money agreement was not to pay the broker real estate commissions 
but merely to sell the property. In this case, there is no 
reason for Mrs. Robbins to prove that the bond was "intended" to 
benefit her directly: the sole purpose of the bond was to 
protect her. To be sure, without a possible and foreseeable 
9
 Other than Defendant Fletcher, of course, who had already been able to 
obtain another 8,000 shares — 8,000 more shares than he was entitled to. 
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Mrs. Robbins — one which all the parties foresaw — no bond 
would have been necessary. In Tremble, the realtor could have 
been paid or not been paid regardless of an earnest money 
agreement and its purpose. 
In Fleck v. National Property Management, Inc., supra, 
the defendants argued that damages were not caused by the failure 
to do that for which the bond was designed to accomplish, namely, 
the construction of improvements on certain property. In this 
case, Mrs. Robbins1 damages have been caused by that very failure 
for which the bond was put up, namely, to cover all damages 
caused by a lost instrument that resurfaces. The Fleck 
plaintiffs lost property through a foreclosure sale under trust 
deeds. Such plaintiffs didn't redeem, but claimed their damages 
were the result of defendants' failure to improve the 
property — property they had already lost. The Fleck court held 
that plaintiffs' damages had nothing whatsoever to do with the 
bond. This is because the damages caused the Fleck plaintiffs 
(i.e., loss of title to the property) were not reasonably 
foreseeable from a breach of the bond contract. Failure to make 
improvements did not cause foreclosure of the trust deeds and 
plaintiffs' consequent loss of title. On the contrary, in this 
case, the failure of the ICAs to do anything, let alone honor 
their bond (which is apparently not worth the paper it's written 
on), has indeed been the proximate cause of Mrs. Robbins' 
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damages,10 The issue is thus simply whether the parties to the 
bond contract had a purpose or object to benefit a third person. 
Kelly v. Richard, 95 Utah 560, 83 P.2d 731 (1938). In this case, 
the Cross-Appellees did, not merely by virtue of the bond itself, 
but by their own undisputed conduct once Mrs. Robbins lodged her 
claim. 
In Rio Algom Corporation v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497 
(Utah Sup. Ct. 1980), this Court held that third-party 
beneficiaries are persons recognized as having an enforceable 
right created on a contract to which they give no consideration. 
Again, had it not been for the possibility of Certificate No. 258 
resurfacing, the bond wouldn!t have been necessary. Thus, how 
can the Cross-Appellees argue that the actual parties to the bond 
did not in fact contemplate her? In none of the cases cited by 
the ICAs before the lower court were the third-parties directly 
damaged by the parties against whom they sought to recover as 
their third-party beneficiaries. As a matter of fact, contrary 
to what the Cross-Appellees have asserted below, the issue in Rio 
Algom was merely whether there was a fiduciary relationship 
between co-tenants. Stoltz v. Maloney, 6 30 P.2d 560, 56 3 (Ariz. 
App. 1981). Such is irrelevant here. In this case, there is 
absolutely no question that the Cross-Appellees1 failure to 
10 in fact, the Cross-Appellees' entire defense below has been railroaded by 
the ICAs, thereby preventing Atlas and Check Rite, the obligees on the bond, from settling, 
even if they had wanted to. See Atlas' crossclaim below, R. 140-166. 
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deliver Mrs. Robbins replacement stock on a rising market price 
for such stock directly caused her damage. 
POINT II 
MRS. ROBBINS IS IN PRIVITY OF CONTRACT WITH THE 
INSURANCE COMPANY CROSS-APPELLEES ("ICA"S) BY VIRTUE 
OF THEIR CONDUCT, REPRESENTATIONS, AND DIRECT 
DEALINGS WITH HER OR OTHERWISE, UNDER PRINCIPLES 
OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL. FOR THIS REASON, 
MRS. ROBBINS1 CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED. 
The elements of estoppel are: "Conduct by one party 
which leads another party in reliance thereon, to adopt a course 
of action resulting in detriment or damage if the first party is 
permitted to repudiate its conduct." Clarke v. American Concept 
Insurance Co., 87 Ut. Adv. Rep. 29, 31, 758 P.2d 470 (Ut. Ct. of 
App. 1988); Scheller v. Dixie Six Corp., 81 Ut. Adv. Rep. 27, 28, 
753 P. 2d 971 (Ut. Ct. of App. 1988); Blackhurst v. TransAmerica 
Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688, 691 (Ut. Sup. Ct. 1985). More recently, 
in Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Board, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 
25, 27, 795 P.2d 671 (Ut. Ct. of App. 1990), the Utah Court of 
Appeals articulated the elements essential to invoke equitable 
estoppel, all of which are present here. There is no question 
that ICAs1 continuous misleading conduct and lulling activity led 
Mrs. Robbins, in direct reliance thereon, to adopt a course of 
action resulting in her detriment or damage,11 particularly if 
1 1
 For instance, had Mrs. Robbins known what she knows today, she would 
have immediately filed suit in May, June or July 1988 and obtained some kind of order 
enjoining the ICAs from not honoring the bond or otherwise compelling them to immediately 
furnish her replacement stock. 
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the ICAs are now permitted to repudiate such conduct. 
Accordingly, if the lower court dismissed Counts III, IV, and V 
of Mrs. Robbins1 Amended Complaint, Exhibit "A" hereto, on the 
basis of an alleged "lack of privity," it erred.12 
In order to determine the nature of a contract or if 
there is one between Mrs. Robbins and the Cross-Appellees, the 
Court must consider the intent of the parties and the totality of 
circumstances. Rhodes v. Allied Development Company, 719 P.2d 
83, 85 (Ut. Sup. Ct. 1986). Based on Guardalabene1s conduct and 
Atlas' oral assignment of its rights to Mrs. Robbins, the issue 
of whether Mrs. Robbins and any Cross-Appellee had any 
"contract," or were otherwise in privity, is a question of fact 
precluding the lower courtfs summary dismissal without a trial. 
POINT III 
MRS. ROBBINS1 AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE 
OF ACTION AGAINST CROSS-APPELLEES IN TORT BECAUSE 
CROSS-APPELLEES OWED, HAD, OR ASSUMED A DUTY TO 
HER AND OTHERWISE, THEIR CONDUCT WAS UNREASONABLE 
AND IT DIRECTLY AND PROXIMATELY CAUSED HER DAMAGE. 
The ICAs have cited Arnica Mutual Insurance Company 
v. Schettler, 100 Ut. Adv. Rep. 17, 768 P.2d 950 (Ut. Ct. of App. 
1 2
 Mrs. Robbins may also have a contract with the ICAs implied-in-fact. See 
Scheller, supra at 30. There is no question that Guardalabene represented to Mrs. Robbins 
that if she furnished him all of the documentation he requested that the matter would not 
only be settled, but it would be settled quickly. There is thus detrimental reliance, a 
substitute for consideration. Guardalabene knew or should have known that Mrs. Robbins 
expected him to fulfill his promises. In this regard, the existence of an implied-in-fact 
contract is also a question of fact. Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area Community Action Program, 
110 Ut. Adv. Rep. 51, P.2d , (Ut. Ct. of App. 1989)(writ of cert, filed). 
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1989) and Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Ut. 
1985) for the proposition that Mrs. Robbins1 tort claims (i.e., 
Counts III and V) are barred. On the contrary, all Beck did was 
hold that a tort cause of action in a third-party context is not 
present in a first-party situation. Saying it another way, Beck 
only holds that in a first-party relationship, the duties and 
obligations of the parties are contractual rather than fiduciary. 
This is consistent with this Court's previous recognition of a 
tort cause of action for breach of an insurer's obligation to 
bargain in a third-party context. Ammerman v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 19 Utah 2d 261, 430 P.2d 576 (1967). In this case, the 
ICAs created a fiduciary relationship with Mrs. Robbins by virtue 
of the conduct of Guardalabene, their exclusive agent. In 
Timmons v. Royal Globe Insurance Company, 653 P.2d 907 (Okla. 
1982), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held: 
There is but one duty to deal fairly and in 
good faith, which is owed by the insurer to 
both the insured and third-parties. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Timmons at p. 911. 
Recently, this Court clarified Beck in Culp Construction 
Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 6 and notes 9 and 
12, 795 P.2d 650 (Ut. Sup. Ct. 1990). Culp is thus dispositive 
of this entire cross-appeal. 
Based on the foregoing, Mrs. Robbins is entitled to 
maintain her tort action for the ICAs' bad faith refusal or bad 
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faith bargaining with her and Cross-Appellees Atlas and Check 
Rite, Mrs. Robbins is further entitled to maintain her tort 
claim against all Cross-Appellees for breach of an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Count III of her Amended 
Complaint.13 
The ICAs have argued that they had no duty to 
Mrs. Robbins and caused her no damage. This is completely belied 
by the facts of this case. No reasonable person, let alone a 
reasonable attorney employed by any reputable insurance company, 
would have led a person down the primrose path for several months 
thinking it was proper for her to be dealing directly with him 
(whether she was or not), only to turn around after the price of 
the stock had dropped and inform her that she had been wasting 
her time. If this is not bad faith or at least breach of any 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or, something 
exceedingly more pernicious, then such concepts simply have no 
meaning. The ICAs have cited the case of Beach v. The University 
of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986) for the proposition that they 
1 3
 Recently, the Court of Appeals issued Pixton v. State Farm Mutual, 158 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 31, P.2d (Ut. Ct. of App. April 8, 1991). Therein, the court misread Beck 
and held that a contractual duty is a necessary prerequisite to tort liability (i.e., a fiduciary 
duty). Id. at p. 34, top. This is neither the law of this Court nor what Beck holds. 
Regardless, there became a contractual relationship in this case and if not, the reality is 
that the ICAs did cause Mrs. Robbins damage. As a result, it shouldn't matter how the 
relationship between the parties to this appeal is characterized. See e.g., Culp Const. Co. 
v. Buildmart Mall, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 6, and notes 9 and 12, 795 P.2d 650 (Ut. Sup. Ct. 
June 20, 1990)f... our holding in Beck does not preclude the bringing of a tort claim 
independently of a contract claim.) In short, the Court of Appeals' Pixton decision cannot 
be squared with this Court's decisions in Beck and Culp Construction. 
- 2 2 -
did not commit a tort on Mrs. Robbins. That case merely involved 
a student who was injured when a University-sponsored field trip 
resulted in an injury. The Court held that "the law imposes upon 
one party an affirmative duty to act only when certain special 
relationships exist between the parties." Id. at 415. 
Unfortunately for the Cross-Appellees, the case at bar clearly 
involves a "special relationship" existing between Mrs. Robbins 
and the ICAs by virtue of not only the bond, but Guardalabene1s 
undisputed conduct and continuous false representations. 
Further, the case at bar involves an "affirmative duty" existing 
by virtue of an open penalty indemnity bond providing for 
"absolute liability." Beach supra has been quoted in University 
of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P. 2d 54, 58 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 1987), in 
which the Colorado Supreme Court stated that 
the law appears . . . to be working slowly 
toward a recognition of the duty to aid or 
protect in any relation of dependence or 
mutual dependence. (Citing Beach at 415-16.) 
The ICAs contend that the circumstances of this case do 
not create any duty or any special relationship. Such argument 
is simply antithetical to the facts of this case: the ICAs in 
fact treated Mrs. Robbins as an obligee on the bond and as though 
they had a fiduciary relationship or other obligation to her. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court's summary dismissal of Counts III, IV, 
and V of Mrs. Robbins' Amended Complaint without a trial is 
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manifest error. Certainly there is an issue of fact as to 
whether the ICAs' conduct resulted in either detrimental reliance 
or the creation of a privity situation. If there is no privity 
as a matter of law, such may only mean that Count IV was properly 
dismissed below. Counts III and V are grounded in tort and, 
under Beck and Culp Construction, Mrs. Robbins has valid tort 
claims against Cross-Appellees. This is evidenced by 
Mrs. Robbins1 several lower court affidavits, each of which are 
attached in the addendum hereto and their contents incorporated 
by reference. 
There are innumerable justiciable issues of fact 
remaining to be resolved in this case. Based on the foregoing, 
the lower court should be reversed so Mrs. Robbins may present 
her just claims to a jury. 
DATED this 27th day of August, 1991. 
(Broadwater) Robbins 
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The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 27th day of 
August, 1991, (s)he mailed sufficient true and correct copies of 
the foregoing CROSS-APPELLANT1S BRIEF by regular mail, postage 
prepaid to: 
Robert A. Burton, Esq. 
Stephen J. Trayner, Esq. 
H. Burt Ringwood, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendants Old Republic 
Surety and Northwestern National 
Insurance Company of Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Larry G. Reed, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant Atlas 
CROWTHER & REED 
445 South 300 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phillip R. Hughes, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant Check Rite 
884 South 200 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 y . 
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, No. 3639
 SJ c 
ATTORNEY for Plaintiff 72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah, NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE. 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC.. f /k/a CARDINAL 
ENERGY CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident. 
Defendants. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
JURY DEMAND 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
Plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater hereby alleges and complains that Defendants jointly and 
severally or individually where otherwise indicated as follows: 
PARTIES 
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1. Plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater is a Salt Lake County resident. She is the lawful and 
undisputed assignee or successor-in-interest of KASU Securities, Inc., the purchaser of 
certain shares of Cardinal Energy Corporation subject to this dispute. 
2. Defendant Atlas Stock Transfer Corporation, ("Atlas") is a Utah corporation doing 
business in Salt Lake County. It is an obligee on the open penalty indemnity bond subject 
hereto. 
3. Defendant Cardinal Energy Corporation ("Cardinal") n/k/a Check-Rite International, 
Inc., ("Check-Rite") is a publicly held Utah corporation and the issuer of the securities 
subject to this dispute. Its transfer agent is Atlas and it is an obligee on the open penalty 
indemnity bond subject hereto. 
4. Defendant Northwestern National Insurance Company of Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
("Northwestern") is a Wisconsin corporation licensed as a foreign corporation to do 
business in Utah and further licensed with the Utah Insurance Department to do business in 
this state. It is the obligor on the open penalty indemnity bond subject hereto. 
5. Defendant Old Republic Surety ("Old Republic") is a Wisconsin corporation licensed 
as a foreign corporation to do business in the state of Utah and further licensed with the 
Utah Insurance Department to do business in this state. It is believed to have acquired 
Defendant Northwestern and therefore it is the assignee or successor-in-interest of all 
claims as against Defendant Northwestern. 
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6. Defendant Scott J. Fletcher is a Utah resident. He is the purchaser of and principal 
on the open penalty indemnity bond at issue in this case which he obtained through fraud as 
set forth below. 
JURISDICTION 
7. Jurisdiction over the parties is based on the fact that state courts are of general 
jurisdiction and Defendants Northwestern and Old Republic have consented to jurisdiction 
by being licensed in this state to do business. Jurisdiction is further based on 18 U.S.C. 
§1964(c) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
8. On August 17,1981, Defendant Fletcher placed an order to sell six thousand 
(6,000) shares of Cardinal Energy Corporation ("Cardinal") with Potter Investment Company 
("Potter"), a local securities broker-dealer as evidenced by Exhibit "A" hereto, a true and 
correct copy of Fletcher's stock sale confirmation. On the same date, Fletcher placed a 
similar order with Potter to sell 2,000 Cardinal shares represented by Certificate 568 for the 
account of Jeanne Winder, Fletcher's neighbor, as further set forth below. 
9. On August 27.1981. Defendant Fletcher placed a another order with Potter to sell 
two thousand (2.000) additional shares of Cardinal as evidenced by Exhibit "B" hereto, a true 
and correct copy of Fletcher's stock sale confirmation. 
10. To honor Fletcher's 8.000 share sale orders. Fletcher delivered Cardinal 
certificate No. 258, representing eight thousand (8,000) shares, and issued in his name to 
Potter on 7/27/81. 
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11. On 7/27/81, Potter issued a check to Fletcher in the amount of $1,699.80 as 
payment for his sale of six thousand (6,000) Cardinal shares. It is undisputed that such 
check was received by Fletcher and deposited in his bank account as evidenced by Exhibit 
"C" hereto, a true and correct copy of such Potter check, front and reverse sides thereof. 
12. On 8 /4 /81, Potter issued a check to Fletcher in the amount of five hundred sixty 
dollars ($560.00) as payment for his 4/27/81 sale of two thousand (2,000) Cardinal shares. 
It is undisputed that such check was received by Fletcher and deposited in his bank account 
as evidenced by Exhibit "D", a true and correct copy of such Potter check, front and reverse 
sides thereof. 
13. On or about September 21,1981, Plaintiff Broadwater, acting on behalf of KASU 
Securities, purchased eight thousand (8,000) shares of Cardinal stock from Potter. Potter 
delivered certificate No. 258 to Plaintiff which had been signed over by Fletcher and 
properly signatured guaranteed. Such is known in the securities industry as "street stock" 
and certificates representing such are negotiable instruments. 
14. Approximately one (1) year later, on or about August 23, 1982, Fletcher falsely 
claimed that certificate No. 258 had been lost or stolen. Thereupon Fletcher posted a 
bond through Defendant Northwestern (now Old Republic) and paid the premium thereon. 
Fletcher was issued a new Cardinal certificate in the amount of eight thousand (8,000) 
shares. A true and correct copy on such bond which is the subject of this dispute, the 
premium of which was accepted by Defendant Northwestern, is attached hereto and 
incorporated by reference as Exhibit "E", denominated by bond No. UMI871385. 
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15. Such open penalty indemnity bond, Exhibit "E" hereto, sets forth Defendant 
Northwestern as the obligor thereon and Defendants Atlas and Cardinal (now Check-Rite) 
as obligees. 
16. On or about August 9,1982, Defendant Fletcher also sold, through Potter, 
Cardinal certificate No. 676, also representing eight thousand (8,000) shares and also 
registered in his name. A true and correct copy of Fletcher's stock sale confirmation is 
attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Plaintiff's Exhibit "P. 
17. Defendant Fletcher received $1,374.20 from Potter on 8/25/82 for his sale of 
certificate 676 as evidenced by Exhibit "G" hereto, a true and correct copy of Potter's 
returned check, front and reverse sides thereof, further evidencing deposit of such in 
Fletcher's bank account. 
18. It is undisputed that after selling certificate No. 676 and receiving valuable 
consideration therefor, Fletcher on or about November 23, 1983, claimed and alleged that 
Cardinal certificate No. 676 had been lost or stolen. 
19. On November 23,1983, Fletcher, after having previously sold certificate No. 676, 
and having declared it lost or stolen, caused Defendant Northwestern to issue an additional 
open penalty indemnity bond to cancel certificate 676. A true and correct copy of this 
additional bond, obtained from Defendant Northwestern for Fletcher's benefit, is attached 
hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibit WH" and denominated by Bond No. 
UMI902168. 
20. A new replacement certificate was then issued to Fletcher on said date by Atlas in 
reliance on such bond. 
- 5 -
00073 
21. Subsequently, certificate 676 surfaced and when it was submitted for transfer, 
Defendant Northwestern, after demand by Defendant Atlas, paid sufficient funds to replace 
that certificate in the amount of eight thousand (8,000) shares for its bona fide purchaser. 
22. It is thus undisputed that Fletcher was issued an additional eight thousand (8,000) 
shares on at least two occasions or at total of 16,000 shares as a result of his posting two 
open penalty indemnity bonds through Defendant Northwestern. 
23. Based on the foregoing, Fletcher was able to unlawfully obtain an additional 
sixteen thousand (16,000) shares to which he was not entitled and which he is also believed 
to have subsequently sold, as with the first sixteen thousand shares (16,000), in interstate 
commerce. 
24. The foregoing actions of Fletcher were a fraud in that Fletcher had not lost or 
had stolen either certificate 258 or 676 inasmuch as he had sold such certificates and knew 
or had to have known he had done such. 
25. The two frauds of Fletcher each constitute a "predicate act" of racketeering as 
contemplated in 18 U.S.C. §1961(1) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act and a "pattern" in that regard as contemplated thereunder. 
26. Plaintiff further asserts and believes that Fletcher was and has been under 
criminal investigation by the Utah Attorney Genernl's office for such frauds, an investigation 
at one time spear-headed by David Baskam, a former Assistant Attorney General. Plaintiff 
further believes that Fletcher has been brought before an LDS Bishop's Court for his history 
and pattern of fraudulent activity. In this regard, Plaintiff asserts and believes that 
Fletcher, relative to a "project" in Green River, Utah, Fletcher was promoting, also 
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defrauded Jeanne C. Winder and her family out of approximately $14,000. This conduct 
may constitute but another "predicate act(s) of racketeering" on the part of Fletcher as 
contemplated in RICO. 
27. Plaintiff further asserts and believes that Defendant Fletcher is a sophisticated 
businessman who is knowledgeable about securities and brokerage affairs and who 
maintains numerous brokerage accounts. For this reason his actions are nothing less than 
intentional, let alone reckless, as contemplated in Section 61-1-22(1 )(b) of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act and otherwise under federal securities and other laws. 
28. Plaintiff believes and asserts that Fletcher has engaged in similar if not identical 
"predicate acts of racketeering", namely by fraudulently obtaining lost instrument bonds on 
securities already sold or which he intends to sell and does sell in interstate commerce or 
through the mails. 
29. Plaintiff further asserts that Fletcher was acting or has acted as an investment or 
business advisor for others, including one Jeanne C. Winder, believed to be an 
unsophisticated woman. Fletcher also has never registered under the Investment Advisor's 
Act or Utah's statutory counterpart thereto. 
30. On the same day as Fletcher sold 6,000 Cardinal shares, namely 7/17/81, Fletcher 
also sold two thousand (2,000) shares of Cardinal through Potter for Winder's account and 
he, not Winder, received $560 from Potter on 7/27/81. Fletcher delivered certificate No. 
568 to Potter. On or about December 14, 1982, Fletcher, for Ms. Winder, posted an 
identical Northwestern open penalty indemnity bond on certificate No. 568, based on the 
belief that the certificate Fletcher sold, for Winder on 7/17/81, had been (like Fletcher's 
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two other certs) lost or stolen. A true and correct copy of a third bond Fletcher posted 
through Northwestern for Winder on alleged lost or stolen certificate 568 is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "I" and denominated by Bond No. UMI880735. 
31. Ms. Winder was a neighbor of Fletcher and Plaintiff asserts that at all times 
Winder was acting at Fletcher's exclusive direction. Further, Fletcher was a "control 
person" of Winder as contemplated in Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 
20(a) of the Securities Act of 1934 and therefore her acts are ascribable or attributable to 
Fletcher and he is thereby liable therefor. 
32. Based on Fletcher's control of Winder, Plaintiff asserts and believes that the 
activity of Winder through Fletcher is but a third "predicate act of racketeering" ascribable 
and attributable to Fletcher. Plaintiff asserts that Winder would not have sold her two 
thousand shares (2,000) and then posted an identical lost instrument bond with the very 
same bonding company used twice by Fletcher unless she was acting under his exclusive 
control, direction, and advice. 
33. On or during February, 1985, based on Winder's alleged lost certificate, Potter, 
who had purchased certificate 568 from Fletcher for Winder's account put a demand on 
Defendants Check-Rite, Atlas, and Northwestern to replace certificate No. 568 allegedly 
lost by Winder. 
34. Potter obtained a quote on two thousand (2,000) shares of Check-Rite during 
February, 1985, and Defendant Northwestern honored its obligation on the Winder bond, 
purchasing such two thousand (2,000) shares in the open market to cover its liability. 
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Thereby, Potter received two thousand (2,000) replacement shares of Check-Rite which it 
delivered to the bona fide purchaser of certificate 568. 
35. Based on the foregoing, Defendant Northwestern honored the Winder bond and 
the second bond posted by Fletcher on certificate 676 but, under absolutely identical 
circumstances, has refused to honor bond No. UMI871385 in bad faith and to the detriment 
of Plaintiff as set forth more fully hereinbelow. (See *21 hereinabove.) 
36. In May, 1988, Plaintiff submitted Cardinal certificate 258 to Atlas Stock Transfer 
to be registered in her name. Until that time Plaintiff had held such certificate in her safe 
deposit box for purposes of investment until such time as she sought to have such shares 
transferred. 
37. Atlas responded with a letter attached hereto and incorporated by reference as 
Exhibit "J" in which it refused to act on Plaintiffs lawful request. 
38. Thereafter, Atlas directed Plaintiff to resolve the dispute directly with Defendant 
Northwestern and/or Potter. 
39. Plaintiff telephoned Northwestern's local office in May 1988 and lodged her 
complaint which was ignored. 
40. Based on the non-responsiveness of Northwestern and/or Old Republic's local 
office, Plaintiff, in May 1988, subsequently telephoned such Insurance Company Defendant's 
main offices in Milwaukee, and, over the ensuing months had numerous telephone 
conversations with one Paul S. Guardalabene ("Guardalabene"), Assistant Claims Attorney 
for Defendants Northwestern and Old Republic. 
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41. Guardalabene proceeded to delay the matter by requesting voluminous and totally 
unnecessary and irrelevant documentation as to how, why, and when Plaintiff obtained the 
eight thousand (8,000) shares from KASU Securities, Inc., etc. During such telephone 
conversations of which there were several, Plaintiff continually put demand on 
Guardalabene to replace her 8,000 shares consistent with the Insurance Company 
Defendants' obligations under the open penalty bond. During this time, Guardalabene 
treated Plaintiff and gave Plaintiff the reasonable impression that she was the obligee on 
the open penalty indemnity bond and that it was appropriate for her, as opposed to Atlas 
and Check-Rite, to deal directly with the Insurance Company Defendants. 
42. Prior to July 1988, Guardalabene also had telephone discussions with Potter and 
was informed by and otherwise put on notice directly by John Potter that penny stocks such 
as Check-Rite were volatile and that therefore he (Guardalabene) ought to hurry and 
replace Plaintiff's eight thousand (8,000) share certificate. 
43. Regardless of such demands and warnings, Guardalabene continued to stall and 
delay Plaintiff and based on Guardalabene's dishonor of the bond posted by Fletcher, 
Plaintiff sent a letter to Guardalabene dated July 11, 1988, a true and correct copy of which 
is attached hereto as Plaintiff's Exhibit "KH. Such letter evidences but further uninterrupted 
demand made by Plaintiff on the Insurance Company/Obligor Defendants to replace 
Plaintiff's eight thousand (8,000) shares. 
44. Plaintiff's continued demands were refused by Defendants Atlas, Check-Rite, and 
more particularly, the Insurance Company/Obligor Defendants. 
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45. On July 27, 1988, after continued irrational stalling and delay tactics on the part 
of Guardalabene, acting on behalf of the Insurance Company/Obligor Defendants, Plaintiff 
wrote another letter to Guardalabene, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "L", and which put Guardalabene on further unequivocal notice that Plaintiff not 
only demanded a replacement certificate but that Check-Rite stock had reached a price of 
one dollar per share and could continue to rise in price. 
46. After receipt of Exhibits "K" and Exhibit "L" above, the Insurance Company/Obligor 
Defendants proceeded to do nothing and otherwise redress the damages caused Plaintiff. 
47. Plaintiff asserts that on or about July 28,1988, the price of Check-Rite Stock 
traded at $1.25 per share in Salt Lake City. This is evidenced by a letter from Bagley 
Securities, Inc., a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by 
referance as Exhibit "M". 
48. At this time Plaintiff was also in contact with one Chuck Burton, an account 
executive with Kober Financial in Denver, Colorado, a market maker in Check-Rite stock. 
49. Kober Financial informed and has informed Plaintiff that the price of Check-Rite 
stock traded as high as a $1.50 in Denver, Colorado on or after July 28, 1988. Chuck 
Burton has also telephoned Guardalabene and informed him personally of this fact. 
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50. The Defendants, knew or should have known that the price of Check-Rite stock 
would trade or could have traded as high as a $1.50 per share after May 1988, which it did. 
51. Had the Insurance Company/Obligor Defendants and issuer/transfer 
agent/obligee Defendants replaced Plaintiff's eight thosuand (8,000) shares when request 
for transfer and registration was made, she could have and would have sold them at a $1.50 
per share in Denver or at least $1.25 in Salt Lake City, Utah, in July, 1988, and/or at the 
beginning of August, 1988. 
52. Plaintiff believes and asserts that Defendant Northwestern has a history and 
pattern of refusing to honor its open penalty indemnity bonds, particularly if they are in 
excess of a small amount of money, as further evidenced by a lawsuit involving Defendant 
Old Republic and filed in the Third Judicial District Court of Utah denominated by Civil No. 
C88-3713, assigned to the Honorable Raymond Uno. At such time that Plaintiff discovers 
additional "predicate acts" of racketeering on the part of the Insurance Company/Obligor 
Defendants, she shall seek to amend this complaint and state a cause of action against 
them under 18 U.S.C. §1962(a),(b),(c), and/or (d). 
53. Defendants Atlas and Check-Rite have put substantial and repeated demands on 
Northwestern and Old Republic to honor its bond, the principal of which is Scott Fletcher. 
Such demands on the part of Atlas have been refused and ignored since May, 1988. 
54. Plaintiff's counsel has further put continued and repeated demands on the 
Insurance Company/Obligor Defendants and on the issuer/transfer agent/obligee 
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Defendants to issue Plaintiff a replacement certificate or otherwise pay her damages of the 
highest price of the stock since the time Plaintiff could have sold her replacement shares 
but for Defendants' wrongful conduct. Evidence of such written formal demands include 
three (3) letters from Plaintiff's counsel directed to such Defendants dated September 21, 
1988, September 30,1988. and November 25,1988. 
55. Such Defendants with the exception of Defendant Fletcher have refused to make 
proper restitution to Plaintiff. 
56. Plaintiff's counsel has spent at least 25 hours negotiating in good faith with 
Defendants to make restitution to Plaintiff, such negotiations being undertaken by 
Defendants in bad faith and therefore Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees of at least 
$2,500.00, exclusive of attorney's fees paid her counsel to initiate this action. 
57. The Defendants' refusals, with the exception of the Fletcher, have further been 
asserted in bad faith for which Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant 
to Section 78-27-56, Utah Code Ann. 
58. None of the Defendants have defended the demands of Plaintiff by asserting that 
the lost instrument bond in issue was not valid or binding or that the Defendants 
Northwestern and Old Republic did not receive or accept the premium in consideration for 
its issuance. 
CAUSES OF ACTION 
COUNT I 
WRONGFUL REFUSAL TO TRANSFER 
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59. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were 
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
60. Plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser of eight thousand (8,000) shares of Cardinal 
(Check-Rite) as fully comtemplated in §70A-8-401 and 405(3) Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code, Investment Securities. 
61. Plaintiff had no knowledge of Defendant Fletcher's fraud nor did she know or had 
she ever heard of Fletcher at the time of her acquisition of such shares or otherwise until 
May, 1988. 
62. Plaintiff, as a purchaser, had no notice of any adverse claims as contemplated in 
§70A-8-304, Utah Uniform Commercial Code ("U.U.C.C."). 
63. In May. 1988. Plaintiff presented certificate 258 to Defendant Atlas Stock Transfer 
and lawfully requested transfer in accordance with §70A-8-306, U.U.C.C. 
64. Certificate 258 was properly endorsed as fully contemplated in Article 8, U.U.C.C. 
65. Plaintiff had no duty of inquiry into the problems posed by Defendant Fletcher's 
wrongful and fraudulent conduct. 
66. Plaintiff had no obligation to register her transfer until such time until she sought 
to do so. 
67. Plaintiff's right to registration was not affected by Fletcher's indorsement as such 
did not give notice of any adverse claims. (See Section 70A-8-310, U.U.C.C.) 
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68. Assuming Fletcher's indorsement on certificate 258 was unauthorized, which it 
was not. such was ratified by Fletcher's sale of certificate 258 through Potter in July 1981 
and his receipt of valuable consideration for such sale. (See Section 70A-8-311, U.U.C.C.) 
69. Plaintiff was a purchaser of certificate 258 for value and without notice of any 
adverse claims. 
70. At the time of Plaintiff's purchase or assignment, she could not have known of any 
adverse claims as Fletcher waited one (1) year after he sold it before fraudulently claiming 
certificate 258 was lost or stolen. 
71. A bona fide purchaser is entitled to transfer and registration without 
unreasonable delay as provided in §70A-8-401 and 405(3) U.U.C.C. 
72. Defendant Atlas and Check-Rite should have transferred and registered Plaintiff's 
eight thousand (8,000) shares in May, 1988 when so presented. 
73. Such Defendants' abject failure to do so has damaged Plaintiff in that she was 
unable to sell such eight thousand (8,000) shares in July or August, 1988, when Check-Rite 
stock reached a price of a $1.50 per share. 
74. Had Plaintiff obtained replacement shares in May 1988, she would have 
subsequently sold such shares and obtained approximately $12,000. 
75. Plaintiff prays for damages against Defendants Atlas and Check-Rite as set forth 
below. 
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COUNT II 
CONVERSION 
76. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were 
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
77. Defendants Atlas and Check-Rite received delivery and possession of certificate 
258, Plaintiff's certificate representing the eight thousand (8,000) shares, in May, 1988. 
78. Such Defendants have interfered with Plaintiff's right to control and possess eight 
thousand (8,000) shares of Check-Rite since May, 1988. 
79. Such wrongful interference has been intentional and has caused Plaintiff great 
expense, inconvenience, and damage. 
80. Such Defendants have effectively converted eight thousand (8,000) shares of 
Check-Rite belonging to Plaintiff to their own use. 
81. Such possession of certificate 258 by such Defendants since May, 1988 is 
inconsistent with Plaintiff's right of control and ownership thereof. 
82. Such Defendants have virtually done nothing to remedy the dispute which, prior to 
filing this complaint, has caused Plaintiff to incur attorney's fees of approximately $2,500. 
83. A mistake of law or fact is not a defense to such Defendants' conversion. 
84. Plaintiff prays for damages against Defendants Atlas and Check-Rite as set forth 
below. 
COUNT III 
BREACH OF AN IMPLIED COVENANT 
OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
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85. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were 
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
86. The relationship between Plaintiff and the Defendants, with the exception of 
Defendant Fletcher (with whom Plaintiff was not privity), required such Defendants to deal 
fairly with Plaintiff and otherwise act in good faith. 
87. Such an obligation was a covenant that such Defendants each and all have 
breached. 
88. Utah law recognizes such a cause of action and further that punitive damages are 
available hereunder. 
89. Defendants, with the exception of Defendant Fletcher, are liable to Plaintiff for 
their breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which has damaged 
Plaintiff damage as set forth below. 
COUNT IV 
BREACH OF AN IMPLIED THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY 
CONTRACT ON THE PART OF THE INSURANCE COMPANY DEFENDANTS 
90. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were 
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
91. Defendant Insurance Companies entered into an agreement whereby they agreed 
to indemnify Defendants Atlas and Check-Rite from any loss caused by the resurfacing of 
Check-Rite certificate 258. 
92. The Insurance Company Defendants have breached such agreement by failing to 
honor the bond issued by them. 
00085 
93. Such breach of contract on the part of the Insurance Company Defendants has 
caused Plaintiff, a bona fide purchaser of certificate 258, substantial damage and injury in 
that Plaintiff has not been able to seek restitution from Atlas and Check-Rite until such 
bond was honored by the Insurance Company Defendants. 
94. The Insurance Company Defendants have no excuse or defense for their failure to 
honor the bond issued by them and they have maliciously lulled Plaintiff into the belief that 
she was an obligee on the bond. 
95. Based on the Insurance Company Defendants' breach of contract which they knew 
and had reason to know would damage Plaintiff or a person similarly situated, such 
Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for all damages as a result of such breach as set forth 
below. 
COUNT V 
BAD FAITH REFUSAL ON THE PART OF THE 
INSURANCE COMPANY DEFENDANTS 
96. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were 
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
97. The Insurance Company Defendants have no excuse for their failure to honor 
bond No. UMI871385. 
98. Such Defendants have had since early May, 1988, to honor the bond issued by 
them. 
99. Such Defendants acted negligently or otherwise intentionally in refusing to honor 
their bond obligation and otherwise remedy Plaintiff's damages immediately and reasonably. 
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100. Such Defendants have not acted reasonably and have acted in bad faith by 
innundating Plaintiff with false excuses for their failure to honor such bond and their legal 
commitment with respect thereto. Such excuses include but are not limited to (1) 
unreasonably demanding numerous documentation from Plaintiff that she was the lawful 
successor-in-interest of KASU Securities, Inc., (when Atlas had no dispute with such), (2) 
informing Plaintiff that they were in fact investigating the matter when they were not, (3) 
stalling several months and thereafter contending that the indorsement on certificate 258 
was a forgery, and (4) ultimately informing Plaintiff that she had to deal with Atlas while all 
along leading her to believe that she should deal directly with the Insurance Company 
Defendants. 
101. Plaintiff believes and asserts that the Insurance Company Defendants have 
refused to honor other bonds of a similar nature over the last ten (10) years, bonds in 
particular in which such Defendants' liability exceeds at least five hundred dollars ($500.00). 
102. On the other hand, the Insurance Company Defendants have singled Plaintiff out 
and not honored the bond covering her certificate while honoring the two other Fletcher 
bonds detailed hereinabove. 
103. Such bad faith refusal on the part of the Insurance Company Defendants is so 
outrageous under the circumstances that Plaintiff is entitled to substantial punitive and 
exemplary damages to deter such wrongful and malicious conduct in the future as set forth 
below. 
COUNT VI 
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AIDING AND ABETTING 
104. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were 
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
105. The Insurance Company Defendants knew or should have known that they were 
putting Defendant Fletcher in a position where he could take advantage of and defraud 
others as further set forth elsewhere herein. 
106. The Insurance Company Defendants did not investigate Defendant Fletcher 
reasonably, if at all. Had they done so, they would have either have not issued any bonds or, 
they would have immediately paid for a replacement certificate in May. 1988. 
107. The Insurance Company Defendants should have known better than to rely on 
the false and fraudulent affidavits of Fletcher in issuing open penalty indemnity bonds for 
his benefit. 
108. The Insurance Company Defendants have issued at least three (3) bonds which 
have benefited Fletcher, solely with regard to Check-Rite stock alone and may have issued 
other bonds in his favor with regard to the securities of other issuers. 
109. But for the substantial assistance and aiding and abetting on the part of the 
Insurance Company Defendants, Fletcher would not have been able to fraudulently obtain 
an additional sixteen thousand (16,000) shares of Check-Rite which he did in fact obtain 
fraudulently and is believed to have thereafter sold in interstate commerce. But for the 
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Insurance Company Defendants' aiding and abetting and their subsequent bad faith refusals 
which have further aided and abetted Fletcher, Plaintiff would not have been damaged. 
110. But for the substantial assistance of the Insurance Company Defendants, 
Fletcher would not of have been able to commit his frauds and racketeering as set forth 
below. 
111. The Insurance Company Defendants' aiding and abetting of Fletcher has 
proximately caused Plaintiff damages as set forth below. 
COUNT VII 
NEGLIGENCE 
112. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were 
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
113. Each and all of the Defendants owed Plaintiff the duty to prevent those damages 
of which she has been caused. 
114. Each Defendant breached that duty under their respective circumstances which 
has been the proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages. 
115. Reasonable persons in the same position of each of the Defendants would not 
have acted in the manner that each Defendant has in fact acted. 
116. Plaintiff is entitled to punitive and exemplary damages against each of the 
Defendants for their individual and joint and several negligence which, under the 
circumstances, has exceeded all bounds of reasonableness and for which such additional 
damages are justified as set forth below. 
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COUNT VIII 
VIOLATION OF §12(2) OF THE SECURITIES ACT 
OF 1933 BY DEFENDANT FLETCHER 
117. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were 
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
118. Defendant Fletcher sold a security by the use or the means of an instrument of 
interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of an oral communication, which included an 
untrue statement of a material fact or which omitted to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make his statements, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading. 
119. Defendant Fletcher, when he sold certificate 258 representing eight thousand 
(8,000) shares, omitted to state that he would subsequently declare such certificate lost or 
stolen, that he would execute a false affidavit under oath to that effect, obtain a bond, 
receive an additional eight thousand (8,000) shares to which he was not entitled and 
otherwise put Plaintiff or someone like her in her present position. 
120. Plaintiff did not know and there is no way or means by which she could have 
known of Fletcher's untruths or omissions when she obtained delivery of cerfiticate 258 
from Potter. 
121. Defendant Fletcher cannot sustain the burden that he did not know and in the 
exercise of reasonable care could not have known of his untruths or omissions. 
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122. Defendant Fletcher is the proximate cause, culpable participant, significant 
factor, or proximate cause of the damages inflicted on Plaintiff and under §12(2) case law 
Plaintiff need not be in direct privity with him to recover damages hereunder. Plaintiff thus 
prays for damages against Fletcher as set forth below. 
COUNT IX 
VIOLATION OF SECTION 61-1 -22(1 )(b) OF 
THE UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT ON THE PART OF 
DEFENDANT FLETCHER 
123. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were 
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
124. This count is the Utah statutory conterpart to Section 12(2) of the Securities Act 
of 1933, Plaintiff's preceding cause of action. 
125. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees hereunder. 
126. Plaintiff is entitled to 12% interest from the date of payment for the stock 
subject to this dispute. 
127. Plaintiff did not discover Defendant Fletcher's violation hereunder until May, 
1988. 
128. Defendant Fletcher's violation of this statute is reckless or intentional for which 
Plaintiff is entitled to damages of three times the consideration paid for the security with 
interest thereon at the rate of 12% as set forth below. 
COUNT X 
COMMON LAW FRAUD ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT FLETCHER 
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129. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were 
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
130. Defendant Fletcher engaged in a plan or scheme to defraud and injure Plaintiff or 
someone like her which has caused her and those similarly situated substantial injury and 
damage. 
131. Defendant Fletcher, by selling certificate 258 through Potter Investment 
Company, impliedly represented that he would not subsequently encumber such certificate, 
knowing his representations as set forth hereinabove were false and that Plaintiff's problem 
which has been created by him would eventually occur. 
132. The representations made by Fletcher as per certificate No. 258 itself through 
Potter and in turn to Plaintiff were false. 
133. The false representations made by Defendant Fletcher concerned past or 
present facts. 
134. The past or present facts about which Defendant Fletcher made fale 
misrepresentations were material. 
135. The material, false representations made by Defendant Fletcher about past or 
present facts were susceptible of knowledge by him. 
136. Defendant Fletcher who so represented, knew that that which is alleged herein 
was false or in the alternative, asserted such false representations as of his own knowledge 
without knowing or discerning if such was true or false. 
137. Defendant Fletcher intended that a customer of Potter be induced to act, or in 
misleading a customer of Potter such as Plaintiff into thinking that she or someone like her 
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was justified in purchasing the subject security and thereby relying on Fletcher's 
misrepresentations and omissions. 
138. A customer of Potter namely Plaintiff, was in fact induced to act or was justified 
or reasonable under the circumstances in acting on Defendant Fletcher's false and 
fraudulent representations and omissions either impliedly or directly as per certificate 258 
on its face. 
139. Plaintiff's purchase of the securities was in reliance on the representations of 
Fletcher as he had endorsed certificate 258 and such was properly signatured guaranteed, 
creating the undeniable impression that it was a negotiable instrument. 
140. Plaintiff has suffered damages which are attributable to the misrepresentations 
of Defendant Fletcher, based on his false and fraudulent representations or statements, 
including his affidavit, which are the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury and 
damage. 
141. Defendant Fletcher's scheme or artifice to defraud a customer of Potter, which 
has occurred on at least three occasions with the same security and with the same 
Insurance Company Defendants, is malicious and harmful to the free enterprise system, 
interstate commerce, and the securities industry as a whole, and entitles Plaintiff to 
substantial punitive and exemplary damages to deter fraudulent schemes of this nature in 
which is a sophisticated Defendant such as Fletcher takes advantage of and defrauds an 
individual such as Plaintiff out of substantial funds. 
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142. Defendant Fletcher has engaged in such a plan scheme or artifice to defraud 
other individuals such as Plaintiff for the same purposes and under the same pretenses with 
regard to the same security in issue and also with regard to the securities of other issuers. 
In this regard, as set forth above, he is believed to have been the subject of a criminal 
investigation. 
143. Plaintiff had no avenue or reasonable means of knowing or discovering that 
Fletcher's express and implied representations were false and fraudulent as Plaintiff was 
not apprised of what Fletcher would subsequently do. 
144. Fletcher's scheme or plan or artifice to defraud Plaintiff and someone like her 
was designed to harm and injure her and those similarly situated. 
145. The representations and/or omissions of Fletcher were false or fraudulent and 
when made were then and there known by Fletcher to be false and fraudulent and his 
misrepresentations were matters of material fact inducing Plaintiff's purchase of the 
securities. 
146. Said misrepresentations and omissions of Fletcher were made knowingly and 
intentionally or with the reckless or holding negligent and wanton disregard for the truth for 
the express purpose of obtaining additional stock for which Fletcher was not entitled and 
thereby creating Plaintiff's present situation. 
147. Defendant Fletcher had a duty not to make such representations to Plaintiff 
through Potter and had a duty to disclose facts and circumstances which he abjectly failed 
to disclose to Plaintiff through Potter. 
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148. As a direct and proximate result of Fletcher's breaches of duty owed Plaintiff 
and some one like her, Plaintiff has been substantially damaged and is entitled to have and 
recover against Fletcher, in addition to actual damages, punitive and exemplary damages in 
the amount of at least two hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($250,000.00). 
COUNT XI 
VIOLATION OF THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND 
CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT ("RICO") 
ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT FLETCHER 
149. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were 
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
150. This court has jurisdiction over violations of the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act. 
151. Defendant Fletcher is believed to have engaged in racketeering activity within the 
meaning of 18 U.S.C. §1961(1) including, but not limited to the following indictable offenses: 
(a) the transmission by such Defendant, by means of wire communication in interstate 
commerce, of writings, signals or sounds for the purpose of executing his scheme or 
artifice to defraud Plaintiff and other investors similarly situated in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§1343; 
(b) the use of the mails in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1341 to consummate this and/or a 
similar scheme; 
(c) fraud in the sale of securities; and/or 
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(d) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under Title 11 U.S.C., namely 
bankruptcy fraud. 
152. The conduct of Defendant Fletcher as alleged herein constitutes a pattern of 
racketeering within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §1961(5) insofar as Defendant Fletcher 
engaged in at least two acts of racketeering activity within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 
§1961(1) within the last ten (10) years. 
153. Defendant Fletcher has received income derived, directly or indirectly, from a 
pattern of rackeetering activity and/or has used or invested, directly or indirectly, part of 
such income, or the proceeds of such income, in the acquisition of an interest in, and/or in 
the establishment or operation of, an enterprise or enterprises which is or are engaged in, 
or the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§1962(a). 
154. Defendant Fletcher has, through a pattern of racketeering activity, acquired and 
maintained, directly or indirectly, an interest in or control of an enterprise or enterprises 
which is or are engaged in. or the activities of which affect interstate of foreign commerce 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1962(b). 
155. Defendant Fletcher has, while employed by or associated with an enterprise, 
engaged in, or the activities of which affect interstate commerce, conducted or 
participated, directly or indirectly in the conduct of such enterprise's(s') affairs through a 
pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1962(c). 
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156. Defendant Fletcher has conspired with another (which may include the Insurance 
Company Defendants) to violate the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§1962(a),(b). and (c) in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. §1962(d). 
157. Plaintiff believes and asserts that Defendant Fletcher is a "person" and/or an 
"enterprise" as the case may be as necessary to satisfy the technical pleading requirement 
under the statute, particularly §1962(c). regarding such distinctions and Plaintiff asserts 
that she presently lacks sufficient information to presently make a more particularized 
distinction. 
158. Defendant Fletcher aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, 
or willfully caused the commission of the racketeering activities, regardless of the 
capacities in which he acted, and therefore, is liable as a principal in and to said activity 
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §2. 
159. Plaintiff has been injured in her business or property as a direct and proximate 
result of Defendant Fletcher's violations of 18 U.S.C. §1962 in an amount in excess of 
$40,000.00, the precise amount of which damages is not yet ascertained, but which will be 
established at trial. 
160. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1964(c), Plaintiff is entitled to recover from and against 
Defendant Fletcher threefold the amount of the damages sustained by Plaintiff, in an 
amount believed to be in excess of $40,000.00, to be proven on or before trial, plus the cost 
of this suit, interest, and resonable attorney's fees. 
WHEREFORE, on all of Plaintiff's causes of action, Plaintiff prays for trial by jury; 
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1. On Counts I and II of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against 
Defendants Atlas and Check-Rite in the amount of the highest price of the stock since May, 
1988, an amount to be proven on or before trial and which Plaintiff calculates to be at least 
$12,000.00, for costs, pre and post-judgment interest at the highest legal rate, attorney's 
fees in accordance with §78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., and otherwise, and for any all further 
relief as the court deems fair and equitable; 
2. On Count III of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against all 
Defendants with the exception of Defendant Fletcher in the amount of at least $12,000 to 
be proven on or before trial, punitive damages of several thousand dollars, for costs, pre 
and post-judgment interest at the highest legal rate, attorney's fees in accordance with 
§78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., and otherwise, and for any and all further relief as the court 
deems fair and equitable; 
3. On Count IV of Plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff prays for judgment against the 
Insurance Company Defendants in the amount of the highest price that Check-Rite stock 
has attained since May, 1988, which Plaintiff calculates to be at least $12,000.00, for costs, 
pre and post-judgment interest at the highest legal rate, attorney's fees in accordance with 
§78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., and otherwise, and for any and all further relief as the court 
deems fair and equitable; 
4. On Count V of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the 
Insurance Company Defendants in the amount of at least $12,000 to be proven on or before 
trial, for punitive damages of at least $200,000.00. for costs, pre and post-judgment 
- 30 - 00098 
interest at the highest legal rate, attorney's fees in accordance with §78-27-56. Utah Code 
Ann., and otherwise, and for any and all further relief as the court deems fair and equitable; 
5. On Count VI of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the 
Insurance Company Defendants in amount to be determined on or before trial, for punitive 
damages of at least $50,000.00. for costs, pre and post-judgment interest at the highest 
legal rate, attorney's fees in accordance with §78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., and otherwise, 
and for any and all further relief as the court deems fair and equitable; 
6. On Count VII of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against 
Defendants jointly and severally in an amount to be proven on or before trial, but which 
includes all of the attorney's fees that Plaintiff has incurred in attempting to settle the 
matter without litigation, for substantial punitive and exemplary damages as against all 
Defendants jointly and severally, for costs, pre and post-judgment interest at the highest 
legal rate, attorney's fees in accordance with §78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., and otherwise, 
and for any and all further relief as the court deems fair and equitable; 
7. On Count VIII of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against 
Defendant Fletcher in an amount of her damages which Plaintiff believes to be at least 
$12,000 and which further includes her needless incurring of substantial attorney's fees to 
date, costs, pre and post-judgment interest at the highest legal rate, attorney's fees in 
accordance with §78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., and otherwise, and for any and all further 
relief as the court deems fair and equitable; 
- 31 - (\Oi 
8. On Count IX of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant 
Fletcher in the amount of three times the consideration paid for the security, for costs, pre 
and post-judgment interest at 12% per annum since September 1981, attorney's fees in 
accordance with §78-27-56 and §61-1-22(1), Utah Code Ann., and for any and all further 
relief as the court deems fair and equitable; 
9. On Count X of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant 
Fletcher in the amount of at least $12,000.00, including all attorney's fees that Plaintiff has 
needlessly been required to incur, punitive damages of at least $250,000.00, for costs, pre 
and post-judgment interest at the highest legal rate, attorney's fees in accordance with 
§78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., and otherwise, and for any and all further relief as the court 
deems fair and equitable; 
10. On Count XI of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against 
Defendant Fletcher for violation of any one of 18 U.S.C. §§1962(a),(b),(c), and/or (d) of the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act in an amount of at least $40,000.00, 
for costs, reasonable attorney's fees as provided therein, pre and post-judgment interest 
at the highest legal rate, and any and all further relief as the court deems fair and equitable. 
DATED this 18th day of May, 1989. 
Plaintiff's Address: 
3576 Oak Rim Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
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NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
of Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
B o n d N o . UMI 87 1 3 8 5 
#noiu oil IReii bg tijesc JJrwente, THAT scott,. j..:...«etcher 
cis Principal, and NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation organized and 
'-•\idii;i^ under the laws of the State of Wisconsin, duly authorized to transact the business of indemnity and surety-
ship in the State of _ , and having an office and principal place of business in said State 
at....5,?.5 ? .4.500 S , S a l t L a k e _ C i t y , U t ^
 M Surety (hereinafter collectively called the "Obligors"), 
are held and firmly bound unto 
Cardinal Energy Corporation 
and 
Atlas Stock Transfer 
and unto all such individuals, firms and corporations, as may now and/or hereafter be acting as Transfer Agent(s) 
and/or Registrur(s) of the below-mentioned stock (hereinafter collectively called the "Obligees"), in an amount, pay-
able in lawful money of the United States, sufficient to indemnify the Obligees under the condition of this bond as 
hereinafter set forth, not to exceed, however, the maximum amount of risk which may be legally assumed by the Surety 
under any law governing the validity or performance of this bond, to be paid to the Obligees, and each of them, and 
to their respective legal representatives, successors and assigns, as interest may appear; for which payment well and 
truly to be made, the Obligors do bind themselves, and their respective successors, assigns, heirs and legal representa-
tives, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents. 
SEALED with the seals of the Obligors and executed in 9.^.5..counterparts, this „.?.£_ day 
of A u g u s t
 t 1 9 8 2 
WHEREAS, the Principal represents that said Principal is the owner of Certificate(s) No.(s) .r......... 
. . . . r epresen t ing 8., 0.00... sh.ar es. . of . . .Cardinal _Ene 
. . June . . 17 , . . 1 9 8 1 . 
registered in the name o f * — S c o t t . . J , . . . F i e t c h e r 933.3J.Q. 
thereinafter called "old certificate(s)") ; that the old certificate(s) ha.....?.... been lost, destroyed or stolen so that the 
>ume cannot be found or produced; and that said Principal has not sold, pledged, hypothecated or otherwise trans-
ferred the old ccrtificate(s), or the shares represented thereby, or any interest therein or right thereto. 
WHEREAS, the Obligees, in reliance upon said representations and at the request of the Obligors, arc willing to 
lSiue and deliver a new certificale(a) in the place and stead of the old certificatc(s), upon the execution and delivery 
oi this bond; 
NOW, THEREFORE, the condition of this obligation is such that, if the Principal shall at all limes indemnify 
and keep indemnified and save harmless the Obligees, and each of them, and their respective legal representatives, 
successors arid assigns, from and against Any and all actions and suits, whether groundless or otherwise, and from 
aru^ against any and all losses, damages, costs, charges, counsel fees, payments, expenses and liabilities whatsoever, 
*%h*.h the Obligees, or any of them, or their respective legal representatives, successors or assigns, at any time shall 
or^nny sustain or incur (1) by reason of said issue and delivery of such new certificate(s), or (2) by reason of any 
cla«m which may be made in respect of the old certificate(s), or (3) by reason of any payment, transfer, exchange or 
olh^r act which said Obligees, or any of them, or their respective legal representatives, successors or assigns, may 
i.iake or do in respect o/ the old certincate(a), whether made or done through accident, oversight, or neglect, or whether 
i.iade jr done upon presentation thereof without contesting the propriety of such payment, transfer, exchange or other 
a-'t, or (4) by reason of any other matter or lhing arising out of the recognition of the aforesaid request of the Obligors, 
then this obligation shall be void; otherwise it shall remain in full force and effect. 
The Surety agrees that its liability hereunder shall be absolute, regardless of any liability of the Principal here-
under, whether by reason of any irregular or unauthorized execution of, or failure to execute, this bond, or any absence 
of interest of the Principal in the subject matter hereof, or otherwise. 
It is under?'ood that the obligation hereby created in favor of any such Transfer Agent or Registrar shall not 
be atfcelt.l by t!.e termination of the agency of such Transfer Agent or Registrar. 
"Scott 57 Fle tcher ; 
NORTHWEOTK&N JNATIONAL INSUPUVH^E COMPA^V, 
M^oFKt B9 u(.^^.h.:^1^. Alloratj^o FK( (/ 
Thomas J. Drouqh 
AFFIDAVIT OF QUALIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Thomas J. Brough, being first duly swornf on oath desposes and says 
that he is the ATTORNEY-IN-FACT of the NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, and that he is duly authorized to execute and deliver the 
foregoing obligations; that said company is authorized to execute 
the same and has complied in all respects with the laws of Utah 
in referenced to becoming sole Surety upon bond, undertakings and 
obligations. 
Thomas J, Brcfrugh 
Attorney-in-Fact 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd Day of August, 1982 
My Commission Expires : My Commlssfon ^ lrgs A P r " "• » " 
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 NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
of Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
Bond No. UMI 902168 
&»oi» oil Bleu bg tljcse Presents, mAT...?s^^J^ns^s}iisjL 
as Principal, and NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation organ-'z.-H nnd 
existing under the laws of the State of Wisconsin, duly authorized to transact the business of indemnity and surety-
ship in the State of \r.z,$J!L. ~ _ —.and having an office and principal place of business in said Suite 
at.. 5 2 5 . J E 4.5 0 0 .. .S, S a l t . L a X e C i t y , U.t; as Surety (hereinafter collectively called the "Obligors"). 
aie held and firmly bound unto 
Cardinal Energy 
and 
Atlas Stock Transfer 
and unto all such individuals, firms and corporations, as may now and/or hereafter be acting as Transfer Agent(s) 
and/or Ktgislrur(s) of the below-mentioned stock (hereinafter collectively called the "Obligees"), in an amount, pay-
able in lawful money of the United States, sufficient to indemnify the Obligees under the condition of this bond as 
hereinafter set forth, not to exceed, however, the maximum amount of risk which may be legally assumed by the Surety 
under any law governing the validity or performance of this bond, to be paid lo the Obligees, and each of Uicm, and 
lo their respective legal representatives, successors and assigns, as interest may appear; for which payment well and 
truly to be made, the Obligors do bind themselves, and their respective successors, assigns, heirs and legal representa-
tives, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents. 
SEALED witli the seals of the Obligors and executed in...XW.O....counlcrparts, this 2..3.£d day 
of November
 f 19 83 ^ ^p$ 
WHEREAS, the Principal represents that said Principal is the owner of Certificate(s) No.(s) .(1.7.9 
registered in the name of Scott . . J.,...F.ift.t.f?Mr. 
(hereinafter called "old certificate(s)"); that the old certificale(s) ha..§ been lost, destroyed or stolen so that the 
same cannot be found or produced; and that said Principal has not sold, pledged, hypothecated or otherwise trans-
ferred the old ccrtificate(s), or the shares represented thereby, or any interest therein or right thereto. 
WHEREAS, the Obligees, in reliance upon said representations and at the request of the Obligors, arc willing to 
issue and deliver a new certificate(s) in the place and stead of the old ccrtificatc(s), upon the execution and delivery 
of this bond; 
NOW, THEREFORE, the condition of this obligation is such that, if the Principal shall at all limes indemnify 
and keep indemnified and save harmless the Obligees, and each of ihcm, and their respective legal representatives, 
successors and assigns, from and against any and all actions and suits, whether groundless or otherwise, and from 
and against nny and all losses, damages, costs, churges. counsel fees, payments, expenses and liabilities whatsoever, 
which the Obligees, or any of them, or their respective legal representatives, successors or assigns, ul any time shall 
or may sustain or incur l l ) by reason of said issue and delivery of such ucw certificated), or (?.i by rc.ir.nn nf
 0ny 
claim which may be nude in respect of the old ccrlificute(s), or (3) by reason of any payment, transfer, exchange or 
other act which said Obligees, or any of them, or their respective legal representatives, successors or assigns, may 
make or do in respect of the old ccrtificute(s), whether made or done through accident, oversight, or neglect, or whether 
made or done upon presentation thereof without contesting the propriety of such payment, transfer, exchange or other 
act, or (4) by re::*on of uny other matter or thin? arising out of t!iu rorc^iiitinn oi die afoivt-ivl re.ju«.<*l of the Obligor*, 
then this obligation shall be void; otherwise it shull remain in full force and clicet. 
The Surety agrees that its liability hereunder shall be absolute, regardless of any liability of the Principal here-
under, whether by reason of any irregular or unauthorized execution of, or failure lo execute, this bond, or any absence 
of interest of the Principal in the subject matter hereof, or otherwise. 
It is undcistood that (he obligation hereby created in favor of auy such Transfer Agent or Registrar shall not 
be a flee led by the termination of the agency of such Transfer Agent orjlegislrar. 
AMwOpU'Ut Tmct (J 
Thomas ."i n"^"nh EXHIBIT 
JOXi 
AFFIDAVIT OF QUALIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Thomas J. Brough, being first duly sworn, on oath desposes and says 
that he is the ATTORNEY-IN-FACT of the NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, and that he is duly authorized to execute and deliver the 
foregoing obligations; that said company is authorized to execute 
the same and has complied in all respects with the laws of Utah 
in referenced to becominq sole Surety upon bond, undertakings and 
obligations. 
Thonfas J. Brou 
Attorney-in-Fadt 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd Day of November, 198 3 
My Commission Expires: J\ •'" 
&l± yj^t) <&&*/ 
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NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
of Milwaukee, Wisconsin Bond N o . UMI 88 07 3 5 
Unoiu all Bleu bg Ujcue Jlrcaeula, THAT Jea^^^ 
as Principal, and NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation organized and 
existing under the laws of the State of Wisconsin, duly authorized to transact the business of indemnity and surety-
ship in the State of „..-.?. And having an office and principal place of business in said State 
at 5 2 5 E 4 5 0 . ° :*?/ s^AL.!:!*!^ 
are held and firmly bound unto 
Cardinal Energy 
and unto all such individual?, firms and corporations, as may now and/or hereafter be acting as Transfer Agent(a) 
ami/or Registrar (a) of the below-mentioned stock (hereinafter collectively called the "Obligees"), in an amount, pay-
able in lawful money of the United States, sufficient to indemnify the Obligees under the condition of this bond as 
hereinafter set fordi, not to exceed, however, the maximum amount of risk which may be legally assumed by the Surety 
under any law governing the validity or performance of this bond, to be paid to the Obligees, and each of^lhcm, and 
lo their respective legal representatives, successors and assigns, as interest may appear; for which payment well and 
truly to be made, the Obligors do bind themselves, and their respective successors, assigns, heirs and legal representa-
tives, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents. 
SEALED with the seals of tlie Obligors and executed in counterparts, this day 
f D e c e m b e r ,^ 82 of , 19 
WHEREAS, the Principal represents that said Principal is the owner of Certificate(s) No.(a) 
representing 2,000 shares of Cardinal Enerav stock 
H '••! I l< 
EXHIRIT "L 
•TTOO 
7sJLmgVn<#^^ a i u a surety 
ip in the State of ™ ™ and having an office and principal place of business in said Slate 
5 2 5 E 4 5 0 0 S , S a l t L a k e C i t y / U t
 a 8 Surety (hereinafter collectively called the "Obligors"), 
e held and firmly bound unto 
Cardinal Energy 
id unto all such individuals, firms and corporations, as may now and/or hereafter be acting as Transfer Agent(s) 
id/or Rcgistrar(s) of the below-mentioned stock (hereinafter collectively called the "Obligees1*), in an amount, pay-
jle in lawful money of the United States, sufficient to indemnify the Obligees under the condition of this bond as 
ercinafler set forth, not to exceed, however, the maximum amount of risk which may be legally assumed by the Surety 
ndcr any law governing the validity or performance of this bond, to be paid to the Obligees, and each of them, and 
> their respective legal representatives, successors and assigns, as interest may appear; for which payment well and 
uly to be made, (he Obligors do bind themselves, and their respective successors, assigns, heirs and legal rcprcscnta-
ves, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents. 
SEALED with the seals of the Obligors and executed in ONE , . . 1 4 t h counterparts, this day 
L December ., 19. 82 
WHEREAS, the Principal represents that said Principal is the owner of Certificate(s) No.(s) . 
representing 2,000 shares of Cardinal Eneray stock 
568 
regis.cml in the name of •. i ^ a n n e * « £ ? . £ , 
(hereinafter called "old certificate ( s ) M ) ; that the old certificate(s) ha been lost, destroyed or stolen so that the 
same cannot be found or produced; and that said Principal has not sold, pledged, hypothecated or otherwise trans-
ferred the old ccrtificale(s), or the shares represented thereby, or any interest therein or right thereto. 
WHEREAS, the Obligees, in reliance upon said representations and at the request of the Obligors, arc willing to 
issue and deliver a new certificate(s) in the place and stead of the old certificate ( s ) , upon the execution and delivery 
of this bond; 
NOW, THEREFORE, the condition of this obligation is such that, if the Principal shall at nil times indemnify 
and keep indemnified and save harmless the Obligees, and each of them, and their respective legal representatives, 
siiccettsurs and assigns, from and against any and all actions and suits, whether groundless or otherwise, and from 
and against any and all losses, damages, costs, charges, counsel fees, payments, expenses and liabilities whatsoever, 
which the Obligees, or any of them,, or their ies|>cctive legal representatives, successors or assigns, at any lime shall 
or may sustain or incur ( I ) by reason of said issue and delivery of such new certificate(s), or (2) by reason of any 
claim which may be mad*! in respect of the old certificate(s), or (3) by reason of any payment, transfer, exchange ^r 
other act which said Obligees, or any of them, or their respective legal representatives, successors or assigns, may 
make or do in respect of the old certificate(s), whether made or done through accident, oversight, or neglect, or whether 
made or done upon presentation thereof without contesting the propriety of such payment, transfer, exchange or other 
act, or (4) by reason of any other matter or thing arising out of the recognition of the aforesaid request of the Obligors, 
tiien this obligation shall be void; otherwise it shall remain in full force and effect. 
The Surety agrees that its liability hereunder shall be absolute, regardless of any liability of the Principal here-
under, whether by reason of any irregular or unauthorized execution of, or failure to execute, this bond, or any absence 
of interest of the Principal in the subject matter hereof, or otherwise. 
It is understood that the obligation hereby created in favor of any such Transfer Agent or Registrar shall not 
be affected by the termination of the agency of such Transfer Agent or Registrar. 
^
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Yleanne Windier /-, 
NOKTIIWESTfclLN |^Al)lONAL 1NSUHANCE C O M I / A ^ Y , 
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ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER 
C O R P O R A T I O N 
May 4 , 1988 
LeAnna Broadwater 
3576 Oak Rim Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
RE: Checkrite International 
Dear Ms. Broadwater: 
Enclosed please find a photocopy of Cardinal 
Energy Corporation certificate number SL-0000258 
for 8,000 shares registered in the name of Scott 
J. Fletcher. 
This certificate was reported lost and in 
lieu of which a new security was issued under 
a bond of indemnity dated Aug. 23, 1982. There-
fore, we must refuse your request for registration, 
and propose to retain and cancel this certificate. 
Very truly yours, 
- < n ^ 
Franklin L. Kimball 
Transfer Agent 
FLK:pg 
Enclosures 
EXHIBIT. "j" 
2TT00 
July 1 1 , 1988 
Mr. Paul S. Guardatabene 
Old Republic Insurance Co. 
P. 0. Box 1635 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201 
Dear Mr. Guardatabene: 
Pursuant to our telephone conversation of last week, this 
letter will confirm my purchase of 8f000 shares of Check 
Rite International (formerly Cardinal Energy) from Potter 
Investment Company, Salt Lake City, Utah, on September 21, 
1981. The certificate which was delivered to me by 
Potter Investment Company was #258, in the name of Scott 
J. Fletcher, 9916 Petunia Way, Sandy, Utah 84092. The 
amount I paid for the stock at that time was $.31. 
As I indicated to you on the phone, I purchased this stock 
in good faith from Potter Investment Company for investment 
purposes, and I will in no way accept what you proposed as 
far as settling with me for my original purchase price. 
After further consideration, I feel that it would be in 
everyone's best interests to simply replace the stock so 
that I will be free to sell it whenever I choose. The 
market seems to be firming up on said stock, so lo£ee$uently, 
this matter should be resolved as quickly as possible. 
I look forward to hearing from you in the very near future. 
Sincerely, 
LeAnna Broadwater 
3576 Oak Rim Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Phone: (801) 277-3068 
lb 
EXHIBIT 
July 27, 1988 
Mr. Paul S. Guardalabene 
Old RepublicSSurety Company 
P. 0. Box 1635 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201 
Dear Mr* Guardalabene: 
Regarding our telephone conversation of today, enclosed 
please find documents which shoufid clarify my position 
and status with KASU Securities, Inc. and the fact that 
I am the legal owner of the 8,000 shares of Check-Rite 
International (formerly Cardinal Energy). 
I have high-lighted the pertinent information on enclosed 
documents for your convenience. 
As I stated to you today, the subject stock is now trading 
at $1.00 and could continue to go much higher. 
I will be waiting to hear from you soon. 
Sincerely, 
LeAnna Broadwater 
3576 Oak Rim Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Phone: (801) 277-3068 
lb 
enc l . 
i* i n 
EXHIBIT *~ 
tfTTGO 
B A G L E Y 
SECURITIES, INC. 
Member NASD • SDK: 
Mr. J. Michael Coombs 
72 East 400 South Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
November 25, 1988 
Dear Mr. Coombs: 
This letter is in response to your inquiring today 
regarding the market action of CHECK RITE INTERNATIONAL 
formerly Cardinal Energy. 
Our firm is a primary market maker and has provided 
a continuous quotation for this stock to the investment 
community and the National Quotation Bureau. In 
researching our records, I find that CHECKRITE INTER-
NATIONAL had a high trade of $1.25 per share on July 
28, 1988. 
E r n e s t Muth 
EM/ka 
EXHIBIT. "/r 
EXHIBIT "B" 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, No. 3639 
ATTORNEY for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
"J !";uvd j-j-d-c^l Qts'/ict 
AUGJ 11 1989 
B y — 1 . 
iy Ciork 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER, 
Plaintiff. 
v. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah. NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE. 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation, CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC.. f /k/a CARDINAL 
ENERGY CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF IN 
OPPOSITION TO THE INSURANCE 
COMPANY DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
) 
)ss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
LeAnna Broadwater, on her oath, deposes and says as follows: 
1. That your affiant is the Plaintiff in the above-matter and she has personal 
knowledge as to that which is contained herein. 
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2. That in May, 1988, Defendant Atlas refused to transfer 8,000 shares of the 
stock of Check Rite International, Inc., owned and held by your affiant. (See Exhibit "J" to 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.) 
3. Thereafter your affiant was informed by Defendant Atlas Stock Transfer 
that your affiant was to deal directly with the Insurance Company Defendants as it was 
"their problem." 
4. Your affiant then located Mr. Paul Guardalabene, Assistant Claims Attorney 
for the Insurance Company Defendants who informed your affiant that she was to deal 
directly with him in resolving this problem. In fact, in so many words, your affiant was 
treated by Mr. Guardalabene as an "obligee" on the bond in issue and not being 
sophisticated in these matters, your affiant was led to believe and naturally assumed that 
Mr. Guardalabene would take care of and otherwise resolve the problem as he continually 
so indicated to her. Based on Mr. Guardalabene's conduct and direct and continued 
negotiations with your affiant, your affiant believes and asserts that a "contract" was 
created between herself and the Insurance Company Defendants acting by and through 
Guradalabene. 
5. Thereafter, your affiant corresponded with Mr. Guardalabene at his 
exclusive insistence and furnished him documentation as requested by him as to when and 
how your affiant acquired the Check Rite stock in issue. This is evidenced by Exhibits "K" 
and "L" to Plaintiff Amended Complaint. Your affiant also engaged in several telephone 
conversations with Mr. Guardalabene who even demanded documentation as to your 
affiant's marital status. Clearly, your affiant was reasonably led to believe that the 
Insurance Company Defendants had a contractual obligation with respect to her claims. 
6. As months went on. Mr. Guardalabene informed your affiant that he was 
investigating the matter diligently when your affiant believes he was not. At no time (until 
much later) did Mr. Guardalabene inform your affiant that she was not an "obligee" or 
beneficiary on the bond, assuming she knew what that meant, nor that she should have been 
dealing with Defendants Atlas or Check Rite and that her dealing directly with Mr. 
Guardalabene for several months would have been a complete waste of her time and 
energy. 
7. Because Mr. Guardalabene continued to stall your affiant and kept 
informing her directly that he was "working" on the matter when he was not. your affiant had 
no choice but to retain legal counsel in August 1988 to assist her in this matter. Your 
affiant's counsel then corresponded with Mr. Guardalabene on at least three occasions and 
had additional telephone conversations with him. (See H54 of Plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint.) Your affiant is further informed that at this time Mr. Guardalabene. for the first 
time, brought up the excuse that the signature on your affiant's stock certificate was a 
forgery. Such additional stalling and meritless excuses on the part of the Insurance 
Company Defendants, by and through Guardalabene, directly caused Plaintiff substantial 
damages in the form of attorney's fees far in excess of $2,500, excluding damages for loss 
of time, long distance telephone expenses, and general inconvenience. 
8. That your affiant was eventually informed by her counsel that the Insurance 
Company Defendants would neither settle or resolve the matter, that she, according to 
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Guardalabene, should have dealt directly with Atlas all along after having dealt with 
Guardalabene for several months, and that it would be necessary for her to file suit. 
9. That this lawsuit has followed in that none of the Defendants have been 
willing to remedy the situation and every one of them has pointed the finger at someone 
else, time and time again. That your affiant incurred attorney's fees of $2,500 prior to filing 
suit, your affiant has further been damaged to the extent of at least $10,000 and perhaps 
$12,000 based on the price of Check Rite stock that your affiant could have obtained had 
Defendants pooled together to resolve this matter, and further, your affiant has incurred 
substantial additional damages and attorney's fees since filing this suit. In sum, your affiant 
has been damaged to date to the extent of at least $18,000 and perhaps $20,000. Lastly, 
your affiant believes that most of her damage has been directly caused by the misconduct 
of Mr. Guardalabene acting within the scope of his employment, particularly by virtue of his 
misrepresentations that he could and would resolve the matter and that he had a 
contractual obligation to do so, only, after several months, to turn around and inform your 
affiant and her counsel that all along your affiant should have dealt directly with Defendant 
Atlas Stock Transfer. The foregoing is also not to ignore that Atlas informed your affiant 
she should deal directly with the Insurance Company Defendants and that this was 
repeatedly confirmed by Guardalabene orally and otherwise through his continuous conduct 
and representations to your affiant. 
- 4 -
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
In re: Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, et al. 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF IN OPPOSITION TO THE INSURANCE 
COMPANY DEFENDANTS* MOTION. 
DATED this 13th day of July, 1989. 
jr. Plaintiff LeAnna Broadway 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me thi/l3th day of Jyly, 1989. 
Notary Pvxplic 
ResJdi£jfl^Salt Lake City. UT 
My Commission Expires: *4B^~~^SJ!^™ 
November 8, 1992 I ' I ^ O V J & j S * ^ -: 
I V s c S V y -wOommlsslofi Expires !/ 
f > £ J 5 K r Novembers, 19& g 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ~ ~ 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 13th day of July, 1989, (s)he mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing RULE 56(f) AFFIDAVIT by regular mail, postage prepaid to 
Robert A. Burton, and Stephen J. Trayner, Attorneys for Defendants Old Republic Surety 
and Northwestern National Insurance Company of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, of STRONG & 
HANNI, located at Sixth Floor Boston Building, Salt Lake City. Utah 84111, Larry Reed, 
Attorney for Defendant Atlas, of PARSONS & CROWTHER, located at 445 South 300 East, 
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, Blake T. Ostler, Attorney for Defendant Fletcher, of 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN, located at 330 South, 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
and William Hart, Attorney for Defendant Check Rite, located at 1624 Washington. Denver, 
Colorado 80203. 
B:AFDVT.2 
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EXHIBIT "C 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, No. 3639 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah. NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE, 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC.. f /k/a CARDINAL 
ENERGY CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident. 
Defendants. 
RULE 56(f) AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
John Michael Coombs on his oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. That your affiant is Plaintiff's legal counsel in the above-matter, licensed to 
practice law in the State of Utah, and he has personal knowledge of that which is contained 
herein. 
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2. That Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on file herein contains five (5) separate 
causes of action as against the Defendant Insurance Companies, namely (1) Breach of an 
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, (2) Breach of an Implied Third-Party 
Beneficiary Contract, (3) Bad Faith Refusal, (4) Aiding and Abetting (a violation of §12(2) of 
the Securities Act of 1933), and (5) Negligence. 
3. That the bond subject to this dispute which was issued by Defendant 
Northwestern National, Exhibit ME" to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, by its own terms 
states: 
"The Surety agrees that its liability hereunder shall be absolute,. 
. . . [Emphasis added.] 
4. That your affiant is aware of a similar lawsuit involving Defendant Old 
Republic (Defendant Northwestern's successor-in-interest) presently before his Honor, 
Judge Uno, denominated by Civil No. C88-3713. (See H52 of Amended Complaint.) Your 
affiant is further aware of an identical bond issued by Defendant Northwestern 
denominated by Bond #UMI902229, the principal on which was one George E. Charlton. 
Your affiant has reason to believe that the Insurance Company Defendants similarly denied 
coverage on the Charlton bond as evidenced by a letter attached hereto and incorporated 
by reference as Exhibit "A". Your affiant brings these instances to the Court's attention in 
that such may be probative of continued and repeated wrongdoing on the part of the 
Insurance Company Defendants justifying not only Plaintiff's allegations in her Amended 
Complaint, but further justifying an award of substantial punitive damages against them as 
prayed for therein. 
5. That by their very nature, the five (5) separate causes of action against the 
Insurance Company Defendants on their face involve innumerable issues of material fact 
- 2 -
00 
and because Plaintiff has had no opportunity whatsoever to date to conduct discovery, 
Plaintiff will be severely prejudiced if the Insurance Company Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
or for Summary Judgment is granted in the absence of any opportunity for Plaintiff to 
conduct meaningful discovery or, in the absence of an opportunity for Plaintiff to amend 
her Amended Complaint and allege breach of a contract Implied in law, breach of a contract 
implied-in-fact, promissory estoppel, and/or allege a general claim for damages caused by 
the Insurance Company Defendants. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this 25th day of July, 1989. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me Ms 2 
. >*^f2§?$V Notary Public
 fl I &%&&& CATHY C. ARNOT \ 
I M A K N Y A 1171 Buddk* Drive | if«E9 « ^ S J 
• W S r V S r ^Nov«mbtr8,1952 | 
• >^2S£S St^ofUtah^^j 
My dommission Expires: 
Notary Publjf 
Residing at Silt Lake City, UT 
kHDvj^W-.fi 1 ^ ^ 
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In re: Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, et al. 
Case No. 89-0902684-CV 
RULE 56(f) AFFIDAVIT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 25th day of July, 1989, (s)he mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing RULE 56(f) AFFIDAVIT by regular mail, postage prepaid to 
Robert A. Burton, and Stephen J. Trayner, Attorneys for Defendants Old Republic Surety 
and Northwestern National Insurance Company of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, of STRONG & 
HANNI, located at Sixth Floor Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, Larry Reed, 
Attorney for Defendant Atlas, of PARSONS & CROWTHER, located at 445 South 300 East, 
Suite 300. Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. Blake T. Ostler. Attorney for Defendant Fletcher, of 
KIRTON. McCONKIE & POELMAN. located at 330 South. 300 East. Salt Lake City. Utah 84111. 
and William Hart, Attorney for Defendant Check-Rite, located at 1624 Washington, Denver, 
Colorado 80203. 
B:AFDVT.l \ 
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LAW OFFICES 
SNODGRASS & SNODGRASS 
230O 2tiT AVENUE. SOUTH 
NASHVILLE. TENNESSEE 
372t2 
STANLY T. SNOOCRASS
 (AnCA C o o c 6 | 5 ) 
T. TURNER SNODGRASS TCLEPHONC 383.27SO 
December 30, 1985 
Northwestern National Ins. Co. 
525 E. 4500 S. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84100 
Gentlemen: 
RE: Appalachian Oil <5c Gas Co., Inc> 
Indemnity Bond No. 
On November 19, 1985 this office wrote to you on behalf of our client, 
Appalachian Oil 6c Gas Co., Inc. relative to the above indemnity bond. We have 
had no response to our letter. 
We understand it is necessary for your Company to investigate the factual 
circumstances which we set out. We have, however, been asked by our client to 
seek a response from you as to the Company's intentions in the matter. 
We will appreciate your response. 
Very truly yours, 
TTS/jrm 
V 
^ 
EXHIBIT "D" 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, No. 3639 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah, NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE, 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC.. f /k/a 
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident. 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF IN 
SUPPORT OF HER MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNTS 
I AND II OF HER AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
LeAnna Broadwater, on her oath, deposes and says as follows in Support of 
her Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I and II of her Amended Complaint: 
1. That your affiant is the sole plaintiff in the above-matter and she has 
personal knowledge and experience as to that which is contained herein. 
rip i'? 
'-! -,-> evj t f'M «q^ 
r --Kv-'v,, 
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2. That your affiant has carefully read and helped prepare the Statement of 
Undisputed Facts in her Memorandum in Support of her Motion for Summary Judgment on 
counts I and II of her Amended Complaint and in fact, she personally participated in the 
drafting thereof. That in an effort not to duplicate each of such enumerated Facts as 
detailed therein in this affidavit, your affiant can attest that each and every such Statement 
of Undisputed Fact therein as it pertains to her and her knowledge and experience as to 
how she was mistreated, misled, and "lulled" by certain of the defendants and, as to what 
otherwise transpired in this case, is true and correct in all particulars. 
3. That your affiant can attest that had she had a replacement certificate for 
Certificate 258 at July end/August beginning 1988 she would have sold it. She further 
believes that she would have received the highest price that such stock reached in 1988, 
namely. $1-5/16ths per share, or, at a minimum, at least $1.25 per share. This is because 
your affiant knew of a pending Check Rite merger and she also had a brokerage account 
with Ernest Muth and was daily, if not very closely, following the price of the stock at that 
time. For instance, your affiant would have had an open order placed in which to sell the 
stock at that time. On the other hand, your affiant believes that had she had a replacement 
certificate at such time, she may have well received $1-5/16ths per share as set forth in the 
supporting affidavit of Penny Grace. Thus, your affiant believes that she is entitled to at 
least $10,000 in damages (8,000 shares x $1.25 per share) and perhaps $10,500 in damages 
(8,000 shares x $1-5/16ths per share). Your affiant further believes that she is entitled to 
pre-judgment interest at the highest legal rate or at a rate of no less that 12% and in her 
Amended Complaint she has indeed asked for pre-judgment interest. Lastly, your affiant 
has incurred attorney fees of at least $10,000 just trying to protect and enforce her rights, 
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and she believes that such incurred fees have caused her additional damage which would 
not have occured but for the wrongful conduct of the insurance company defendants and 
defendants Atlas and Check Rite. 
4. That your affiant believes that the defendants (with the exception of 
defendant Fletcher) had a duty to make her whole, a duty which included immediately going 
out into the market in May 1988 and buying 8,000 shares of stock to replace Certificate 258 
on which a lost instrument bond had been posted. That the misfortune of this entire case is 
that no responsible entity or person would help your affiant in any way and no one wanted 
to take responsibility for the problem until there was nothing left to do but file a lawsuit — 
and even then, the defendants would rather spend more money litigating this case than 
giving your affiant what she truly deserves. 
5. That your affiant believes that Guardalabene's investigation of the matter 
was exclusively for his own employer and Fletcher, the principal on the bond, and had 
nothing to do with her inasmuch as she is and was a totally innocent victim. That your 
affiant believes that Atlas, Check Rite, and the insurance company defendants have no 
excuse not to have immediately purchased 8,000 shares of replacement stock in May 1988 
and thereafter and immediately delivered the same to her. 
6. That your affiant does not believe that she had an obligation to go out and 
"cover", namely, to go out into the market herself and with her own money buy replacement 
stock for four reasons: (1) the problem was not her fault, (2) no one ever told her to "cover" 
or do anything else at any time, (3) she did not have the resources or cash on hand to have 
so bought replacement stock herself, and (4) she was not "short" the stock herself, namely, 
she had not sold it to or by or through anyone else and therefore she had no duty herself to 
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deliver 8.000 shares of replacement stock to any third party. That your affiant believes that 
had she been "short" 8.000 shares herself then she arguably would have had a duty to 
"cover", but under the circumstances of this case, she did not. That if anyone involved in 
the case had simply informed your affiant that your affiant should have "covered" — just to 
avoid this lawsuit your affiant would have done so. Unfortunately, no one did and your 
affiant had no reason to think she was acting other than as reasonably as could be 
expected of anyone. 
7. That your affiant has incurred additional damages of substantial 
unwarranted attorney fees, costs, including out-of-pocket expenses, and time expended 
and she believes that she is entitled to such additional damages on which there should be an 
evidentiary hearing. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this^Jday of February. 1990. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me th 
My Commission Expires: 
(/AAL 
Ssiding at Salt Lake City. UT 
B:AFUVT.8 
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EXHIBIT "E" 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER. 
Plaintiff. 
v. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah. NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE. 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC.. f /k/a 
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS-
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
LeAnna Broadwater, on her oath, deposes and says as follows in opposition to 
certain defendants' February 6, 1990, motion for partial summary judgment on Counts I and 
II of her amended complaint: 
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1. That your affiant is the sole plaintiff in the above-matter and she has 
personal knowledge and experience as to that which is contained herein. That your affiant 
incorporates by reference her affidavit filed in support of her cross-motion for summary 
judgment on Counts I and II of her Amended Complaint. 
2. That your affiant disputes the defendants' calculation of a "reasonable time" 
as set forth in their memorandum in support of their motion for partial summary judgment. 
That your affiant believes that she could not have acted more reasonably under the facts 
and circumstances of this case and she believes that defendants Atlas, Check Rite, 
Northwestern National, and Old Republic did not. That in fact, none of the responsible 
parties would assist her or do anything to resolve the problem and in fact there was nothing 
she could do under the circumstances other than eventually file this lawsuit. 
3. That your affiant believes that the conduct of the above-mentioned 
defendants "lulled" her into thinking that they would resolve the matter when they would not 
and did not, and if the Court invokes a "reasonable time" period after the conversion and 
notice of conversion, such a period should be tolled or extended by virtue of the 
misconduct of the above-named defendants — certainly not by any conduct on your 
affiant's part. That less than 90 days after the alleged date of conversion is a "reasonable 
time" in this case because your affiant acted reasonably during all that period and she does 
not know how it is possible that she could have acted more reasonably or diligently. That 
your affiant believes that no reasonable person in her shoes would have acted any 
differently and certainly no one, under the same circumstances, would have thought that he 
or she had an independent duty to effect "cover" and buy replacement stock, especially 
when no defendant informed your affiant of such and such only became an issue after this 
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case was filed. That your affiant believes that no reasonable person would have spent 
several thousand dollars of his or her own money buying replacement stock when any such 
person, and your affiant in particular, is the sole victim of the gross negligence, 
malfeasance, misfeasance, and overall intentional conduct of the defendants. 
4. Because your affiant acted reasonably and the culpable defendants did not, 
a "reasonable time" after the conversion and notice of conversion should include a time 
period up to and until July end/August beginning 1988 when the price of Check Rite stock 
admittedly attained its highest price of $1-5/16th per share. 
5. Lastly, your affiant should add that during one conversation with 
Guardalabene, Guardalabene tried to get your affiant to deal directly with Fletcher to 
resolve the problem. Your affiant responded that she did not think such was her 
responsibility. At that point, Guardalabene informed your affiant that because she was a 
"layman" and apparently didn't understand the situation, she should get a lawyer. Your 
affiant then understood Guardalabene to say that he would no longer deal with her directly 
until she consulted with legal counsel and had him talk directly to Guardalabene. Your 
affiant can attest that after she retained counsel, who in fact tried to negotiate 
unsuccessfully with Guardalabene, Guardalabene was still unwilling to resolve the problem 
and therefore. Guardalabene caused your affiant to incur unwarranted and unjustified 
attorney fees, not only prior to filing suit, but thereafter as well. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED \h\s/jyay of February, 1990. 
eAnna Broadwatej, Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me thi^/Jcfey of February 1990 
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My Commission Expires: uo issiop t: 
Jotary Public 
'Residing at Salt Lake City, UT 
B:AFDVT.9 
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EXHIBIT "F 
FILED D,WCT COURT 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER. 
Plaintiff. 
v. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah, NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE. 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC.. f /k/a 
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident, 
Defendants. 
RULE 56(f) AFFIDAVIT IN 
OPPOSITION TO THE INSURANCE 
COMPANY DEFENDANTS* MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON COUNTS III. IV. 
AND V OF PLAINTIFF'S 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, having been sworn and on his oath, deposes and says 
as follows: 
1. I am plaintiff's counsel in the above-matter and I have personal knowledge, 
experience, and competence as to that which is set forth herein. I am informed and believe 
W 3 4 
'STRICT 
^sab-
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that the following matters need to be completed or explored before any decision can 
possibly be made on the Insurance Company Defendants' ("ICD,,s,) February 27, 1990, 
motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiff's third, fourth, and fifth causes of action 
in her amended complaint. 
2. There is presently outstanding certain responses to discovery on the part of 
the ICDs' to plaintiff's first set of discovery requests that are objectionable, 
non-responsive, and thoroughly and inexcusably inadequate. In particular, these are 
responses to plaintiffs' interrogatories seeking to discover other bonds that the ICDs have 
reneged on, why, who was affected, the results, and whether such resulted in litigation. 
This clearly goes to the ICDs' bad faith and negligence which are issues in this case. 
Further, the ICDs have completely skirted the issue of their company policies with respect to 
issuing bonds of the nature involved in this case and why or how such an open penalty bond 
could ever have been issued to defendant Fletcher, who, in his deposition, has admitted that 
he did not have a $500,000 net worth that was attributed to him as a condition to his 
obtaining bonds which he ultimately obtained. In other words, defendant Fletcher's own 
testimony is at odds with the ICDs' position in this case and their specific responses to date 
to plaintiff's discovery requests. 
3. That the plaintiff has purposely and understandably not sought further 
discovery relative to Counts III, IV, and V of her amended complaint based on her having 
made a motion for summary judgment on Counts I and II of her amended complaint. As 
specifically set forth on the face of her motion, if plaintiff obtains that which she is seeking 
and believes she is entitled to in such motion, she has indicated that she will more than likely 
drop the remaining counts in her amended complaint. This is because if she so prevails, she 
- 2 -
will have been made whole and there will be no reason to pursue the remaining counts 
therein unless she merely wanted to pursue punitive and exemplary damages — something 
which would not be particularly reasonable or cost-effective. 
4. That in my experience as a lawyer, it is more than reasonable for plaintiff to 
try to get what she believes she is entitled to the simplest and cheapest way, which is, to 
seek summary judgment on Counts I and II and not waste time, energy, and money 
conducting unnecessary and expensive discovery as to the remaining counts, especially 
when such is unnecessary. That I don't believe any court would find fault with plaintiff 
trying to be made whole by pursuing such a course of action. Further, I can't imagine that 
another defendant unrelated to Counts I and II, namely, the ICDs, would find fault with the 
same unless such a defendant's counsel wanted to bill his clients for unnecessary work and 
charge 4 or 5 times the amount of actual damages in a case. 
5. That plaintiff has made a motion to amend her amended complaint under 
Rule 15 to include insurance agent Fred S. James of Utah on Counts III and VII of her 
amended complaint, namely, causes of action for Breach of an Implied Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing and Negligence. Since the court has not ruled on such motion and 
such will have an effect on this action and the ICDs' motion for summary judgment on 
Counts III, IV, and V as against them, I believe that it would be highly improper and irregular 
for the Court to rule on such motion of the ICDs until it has ruled on such motion to amend 
and the other dispositive motions now pending before it. 
6. That I believe, as plaintiff's counsel, that plaintiff will be irreparably harmed 
and injured if the Court rules on the ICDs' motion relative to Counts III, IV, and V, without, at 
a minimum, allowing her to conduct further discovery and otherwise take the corporate 
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depositions of the ICDs under Rule 30(b)(6), costs and expenditures that plaintiff should 
certainly not be forced to undertake until the Court rules on her motion for summary 
judgment on Counts I and II. 
7. That in my professional opinion, it is of absolutely no benefit or value to 
anyone, including the Court, to rule on the ICDs' motion relative to Counts III. IV, and V of 
the amended complaint because such defendants are still parties to Counts VI and VII of the 
amended complaint and a favorable ruling on their motion will not be dispositive of their 
remaining exposure and liability under the amended complaint. In particular, I believe and 
have so informed the plaintiff that the ICDs are, at a minimum, liable for negligence in this 
case. In fact, it is clear from the ICDs' motion that they know there are genuine, justiciable 
issues of fact relative to Counts VI and VII or they naturally would have made the same 
motion for summary judgment relative to such counts at the same time. Thus, there is 
nothing to be accomplished by the ICDs1 motion as to Counts III, IV, and V. 
8. That plaintiff has not completed discovery in this action by any stretch of 
the imagination as set forth in this Court's Order of September 11, 1989, and therefore, the 
ICDs' motion cannot be granted unless this Court chooses to reverse itself and its own 
order of such date. That were the Court to in fact reverse its own order of September 11, 
1989,1 believe, as counsel to the plaintiff, that she would be severely prejudiced as she 
could not have afforded to conduct further discovery on incidental causes of action when 
she may indeed easily prevail, and get what she is fully entitled to on her own summary 
judgment motion relative to Counts I and II. 
9. That I believe Mr. Trayner's supporting affidavit of February 27, 1990, is so 
false and misleading in its implications that I am shocked and I cannot in good conscience 
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let it go unanswered. First. I never agreed on behalf of plaintiff to dismiss any counts with 
prejudice at any time. I only told Mr. Trayner that I thought the plaintiff may not be able to 
afford to prosecute other causes of action inasmuch as plaintiff's actual damages are only 
$10,500 with interest thereon since July 31, 1988. If, on the other hand, I did say anything 
derogatory about any causes of action other than Counts I and II. I only meant that I thought 
Counts I and II were better because they could be resolved on the summary judgment level. 
I might add that there has never been any discussion with counsel at any time of "linking" a 
stipulation of facts relative to Counts I and II with a dismissal with prejudice of any other 
counts and Mr. Larry G. Reed, counsel to Atlas, can testify to the same. In fact, there 
would have been no reason to have dismissed any counts of the amended complaint with 
prejudice while the Cross-Motions on Counts I and II are under advisement. I might also say 
that I have practiced law twice as long as Mr. Trayner and I cannot even fathom, for the life 
of me, the legal significance of his affidavit other than it must somehow be an ignoble 
attempt to slander me personally and somehow have the Court think that I do not keep my 
word — something to which I take personal affront and which is a complete falsehood. 
That I also consider Mr. Trayner's enclosures of my confidential correspondence to him, 
among other things, as a breach of trust. I would further like to say unequivocally that 
counts III, IV, V, VI, and VII to plaintiff's amended complaint are meritorious (whether 
discovery is complete or not) as this Court has already ruled that they state a claim. 
Further, neither I nor my client was ever under any obligation of any kind to dismiss any of 
counts against the ICDs with or without prejudice. I can only add that if my client does not 
receive the relief to which she believes she is entitled on her Counts I and II summary 
judgment motion, then she intends to go to jury trial on such other counts. This is because 
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I have advised her that in my professional opinion, the ICDs are liable on some or all of such 
counts and it is simply a question of the economics and practicality of plaintiff's pursuing 
the same to trial. Certainly, she is entitled to her day in court and I can't imagine this Court 
begrudging her that. 
My Commission Expires: 
November 8, 1992 
B:AFDVT.12-13 
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